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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate bankruptcy cases1 are expensive.2  Perhaps even too 
expensive.3  Empirical evidence suggests that cases may be so expensive 
because some bankruptcy professionals overcharge their clients.4  
Although chapter 11 has an elaborate fee control system designed to 
prevent professional overcharging, the system is inadequate.  Chapter 
11’s fee control system appears to be failing for at least two reasons. 
First, chapter 11’s fee control system suffers from information 
deficits.  Information deficits arise because creditors and other parties 
to bankruptcy cases often fail to object to instances of potential 
overcharging.  Without objections to highlight potential instances of 
professional overcharging, bankruptcy judges must often fail to reduce 
 
 1  The phrase “corporate bankruptcy cases” is used to refer to cases brought under 
chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, notwithstanding that individuals 
may also file chapter 11 cases.  See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 
92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 
Bankruptcy Code or Code].  Individual chapter 11 cases are not the subject of this 
Article. 
 2  After all, professional fees in the Lehman cases have already exceeded several 
billion dollars.  See James O’Toole, Five Years Later, Lehman Bankruptcy Fees Hit $2.2 
Billion, CNN MONEY (Sept. 13, 2013, 6:24 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/09/13/ 
news/companies/lehman-bankruptcy-fees/. 
 3  See Stephen Lubben, The Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: How Little We Know 
(June 5, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2446663 [hereinafter Lubben, The Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy]; see 
also Troy A. McKenzie, Bankruptcy and the Future of Aggregate Litigation: The Past as 
Prologue?, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 839, 845 (2013).  Cf. Stephen Lubben, The Direct Costs of 
Corporate Reorganization: An Empirical Examination of Professional Fees in Large Chapter 11 
Cases, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 509, 512 (2000) [hereinafter Lubben, Direct Costs] (“Chapter 
11 is substantially less expensive than other significant corporate transactions.”).  But 
cf. Stephen J. Lubben, The Microeconomics of Chapter 11—Part 2, 4 INT’L CORP. RESCUE 
87, 91 (2007) [hereinafter Lubben, The Microeconomics of Chapter 11] (arguing that if 
“the direct costs of chapter 11 are in line with other large corporate transactions[,]” 
chapter 11 is not too expensive).  The core idea of chapter 11 is that it may be possible 
to reorganize a company, pay related expenses, and leave creditors better off than they 
would have been if the company was not reorganized.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) 
(2011) (legislative statements) (setting forth the “best interests” test, and requiring 
that each creditor or interest holder receive as much under a chapter 11 plan as they 
would have received in a chapter 7 liquidation). 
 4  See infra Part I.B. 
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fees and expenses even when they should be reduced.  By contrast, if 
bankruptcy judges were alerted to possible problems, they could 
investigate and reduce fees and expenses, as appropriate.5  Therefore, 
improving chapter 11’s fee control system likely requires that 
bankruptcy courts receive better information about instances of 
potential overbilling, whether through objections or otherwise. 
Second, chapter 11’s fee control system is challenging, tedious, 
and, in many of the largest cases, potentially overwhelming.  A single 
mega-bankruptcy case can necessitate the review of thousands of pages 
of time and expense entries over the life of that case.6  In order to 
prevent professional overcharging, these entries must be carefully 
reviewed to identify patterns, compared against relevant local rules or 
fee application guidelines, and cross-checked across professionals.  Fee 
Controllers—those tasked with preventing professional overcharging 
in bankruptcy cases—need additional assistance to do this job well.7  In 
other words, chapter 11’s fee control system needs a greater ability to 
scale up the number of fee reviewers and to ensure that the 
information received by the fee control system is efficiently processed 
and utilized.8 
Crowdsourcing—broadly conceived as solving problems by 
drawing on the contributions of many people—can help Fee 
Controllers both to obtain better information and to better utilize the 
 
 5  In many cases, those with the best information about instances of potential 
professional overcharging will be other professionals involved in a particular case.  
Individual creditors, particularly those who frequently participate in corporate 
bankruptcy cases, such as banks, may also be attuned to instances of potential 
overcharging. 
 6  Lois R. Lupica & Nancy B. Rapoport, Best Practices for Working with Fee Examiners, 
32 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20, 20–21 (June 2013).  Of course, not every court requires a fee 
application to be “the size of a boring victorian novel” but a conservative approach 
explains the voluminous nature of many fee applications, particularly when the estate 
also pays for those applications to be prepared.  See In re Hotel Assocs., 15 B.R. 487, 
488 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).  
 7  This Article uses the term “Fee Controllers” to refer to the bankruptcy judge 
and Assistant United States Trustee involved in a particular case.  In certain instances, 
other parties-in-interest and, where appointed, fee examiners may also be considered 
Fee Controllers.  Other parties to the case, however, infrequently participate in fee 
control, and fee examiners are infrequently appointed, except in the largest cases.  In 
bankruptcy mega-cases, where fee examiners and committees are appointed more 
routinely, even their assistance seems to be unable to turn the tide.  See Lupica & 
Rapoport, supra note 6, at 20. 
 8  Fee examiners, fee committees and auditors already serve this role in certain 
cases.  But, as discussed infra, crowdsourcing can be more effective and less expensive.  
With appropriate incentives, creditors might also be willing to be more active 
participants in bankruptcy cases, just as Congress appeared to imagine that they would 
be.  
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information they receive.  First, crowdsourcing can help produce 
better information, both about general market conditions and about 
specific instances of potential overcharging.9  Crowdsourcing’s 
usefulness as an information-gathering tool has been long 
recognized.10  Market economies, which allocate goods and services by 
using the wisdom of crowds to set prices, are an example of how 
crowdsourcing can produce useful information.11  In every bankruptcy 
case, there exists a coterie of bankruptcy professionals who have the 
information and judgment necessary to help improve the fee control 
system.  A crowdsourced fee control system could tap into this 
expertise.  In addition, crowdsourcing could allow other parties, even 
non-bankruptcy experts, to supply information about their relevant 
experiences to improve chapter 11’s fee control system.12 
A crowdsourced fee control system could also help improve the 
usefulness of information received by enlisting the general public in 
reviewing fee applications and related disclosures by professionals, as 
well as any additional information produced by other members of the 
 
 9  See infra Part III.A.i. 
 10  See, e.g., AUDOBON.ORG, http://www.audubon.org/conservation/science/ 
christmas-bird-count (discussing how the Audobon Society crowdsources its annual 
Western Hemisphere bird count); Top 5: Oldest Examples of Crowdsourcing, ARTICLE ONE 
PARTNERS (Sept. 16, 2011), http://info.articleonepartners.com/top-5-oldest-
examples-of-crowdsourcing/ (describing the crowdsourcing of “[a]ncient Babylonian 
[h]ealth [c]are” as when “the family of the sick person would leave him or her out in 
the middle of town.  There, ‘passers-by come up to him, and if they have ever had his 
disease themselves or have known any one who has suffered from it, they give him 
advice.’”).  See Ines Mergel et al., The Challenges of Challenge.Gov: Adopting Private Sector 
Business Innovations in the Federal Government, 2014 47th HAW. INT’L CONF. ON SYS. SCI. 
2073, 2076 (2014), http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber 
=6758860 (suggesting that crowdsourcing is best for solving problems related to 
“research, information and information managing applications”).   
 11  See generally ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (London, W. Strahan and T. 
Cadell 1776); cf. Lee Anne Fennell, Crowdsourcing Land Use, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 385 
(2013). 
 12  One question that must be addressed when designing a crowdsourcing system 
is who should be part of the crowd.  Some studies suggest casting the widest possible 
net, but others suggest a more limited crowd may be appropriate.  See, e.g., Daren C. 
Brabham, Crowdsourcing the Public Participation Process for Planning Projects, 8 PLAN. 
THEORY 242, 245 (2009) [hereinafter Brabham, Crowdsourcing the Public Participation 
Process] (noting that unrestrained public participation may not be an unmitigated 
good); see also Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 
124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1466 (2011) (noting that larger crowds produce more 
information but that each piece of information is, on average, of lesser quality when 
the crowds are larger).  The distinction between studies seems to boil down to two 
related inquiries: how many responses will be generated and will the volume of those 
responses overwhelm the person(s) responsible for sorting through them.  While 
addressed to some degree in this Article, this issue will be explored in greater detail in 
a planned follow-up article.  See also infra note 280 and Part III.B.i. 
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crowd.  Crowdsourcing allows large and/or tedious projects to be 
broken into small, discrete problems that can then be outsourced to 
potential problem-solvers.13  Because bankruptcy fee applications 
already report time in increments as small as six minutes, the task of 
reviewing fee applications seems well-suited to being crowdsourced.14  
In addition, crowdsourcing may be able to introduce greater 
innovation into the fee control process.  And finally, because a 
crowdsourced system can supplement (and need not displace) the 
existing fee control infrastructure, there is little downside risk to 
crowdsourcing fee control. 
It is time to apply crowdsourcing principles to solve chapter 11’s 
fee control problems, and this Article suggests how crowdsourcing 
might do so.  In Part I, this Article explains the design of chapter 11’s 
fee control system and describes the empirical evidence suggesting 
that professional overcharging is a significant and widespread 
problem.  This part will also discuss why chapter 11’s fee control system 
currently results in sub-optimal fee review and the essential elements 
of an effective fee audit.  Part II defines crowdsourcing, explains how 
it works, and provides three examples that demonstrate 
crowdsourcing’s advantages in solving chapter 11’s fee control 
problem.  Finally, Part III explains both how crowdsourcing can help 
deter or prevent professional overcharging in chapter 11 cases and 
provides some preliminary thoughts about the optimal design of a 
crowdsourced fee control system. 
I. THE CHAPTER 11 FEE CONTROL SYSTEM 
Corporate bankruptcy cases have long been viewed as excessively 
expensive.15  In recent years, one of the primary drivers of that 
expense—professional representation—has substantially outpaced 
 
 13  See infra Part II. 
 14  See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2016(a) (requiring that professionals wishing to receive 
compensation from the estate submit a formal fee application setting forth, among 
other information, “a detailed statement of (1) the services rendered, time expended 
and expenses incurred, and (2) the amounts requested”); see also James B. Hirsch, 
Note, Bankruptcy Fee Applications: Compensable Service or Cost of Doing Business?, 58 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1327, 1327 (1990) (These disclosures are essential because they allow 
bankruptcy courts to make the necessary factual determinations “as to whether the 
fees requested are reasonable.”).   
 15  See Lubben, The Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy, supra note 3 (dating concerns 
about bankruptcy costs to the first national bankruptcy laws); see also McKenzie, supra 
note 3, at 845 (“Commentators—both scholarly and popular—remain critical of the 
large fees garnered by lawyers in bankruptcy cases.”).  Arguably, however, bankruptcy 
cases are not excessively expensive. Lubben, The Microeconomics of Chapter 11, supra note 
3.  
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inflation.16  One reason for this rapid run-up may be that the 
bankruptcy system lacks robust controls to ensure bankruptcy 
professionals do not overcharge their clients.17  It appears that chapter 
11’s fee control system fails to sufficiently deter or prevent bankruptcy 
professionals from “padding” their bills by charging for work they 
never performed, “milking” client files by doing unnecessary work or 
otherwise aggressively billing for inefficient work, or treating their bills 
as the opening bid in a negotiation over their fees rather than a record 
of time reasonably spent.18 
Even though the available empirical evidence suggests that 
professional overcharging is a frequent and widespread problem,19 
 
 16  More than five times as fast as the rate of inflation according to one study.  See 
Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Professional Overcharging in Large Bankruptcy 
Reorganization Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 983, 985 (2008) [hereinafter, LoPucki 
& Doherty, Professional Overcharging] (reporting that professional fees and expenses in 
large, public company bankruptcy cases increased by 71% over the six-year period of 
the study compared to a 14% rise in consumer prices).  See also Robert M. Lawless & 
Stephen P. Ferris, Direct Costs in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 629 (2000) 
(providing some empirical information on the cost of chapter 11’s direct costs, 
including professional fees). 
 17  Some commentators have wondered if bankruptcy courts should be involved in 
policing the fees paid to bankruptcy professionals at all.  After all, if the person paying 
the bill does not care, then why should anyone else?  See Cynthia Baker, Other People’s 
Money: The Problem of Professional Fees in Bankruptcy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 35, 41–69 (1996).  
Others have suggested a role for the court is appropriate because there is “a significant 
conflict of interest between client and attorney” once the work is done and the attorney 
seeks money that would otherwise inure to the estate or to the creditors.  See Third Cir. 
Task Force, Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 FED. RULES DECISIONS 237, 266 (1986). 
 18  See AM. BANKR. INST., CHAPTER 11 FEE STUDY: MOVING FORWARD ANALYSIS 931, 
943–44 (2008) [hereinafter MOVING FORWARD] (material provided at ABI’s 13th 
Annual Southeast Bankruptcy Workshop, July 16–19, 2008) (Professionals are not 
supposed to be compensated “for either inefficiency or for spending time on projects 
that are not beneficial to the estate.”); Carl T. Bogus, The Death of an Honorable 
Profession, 71 IND. L.J. 911, 914 (1996) (indicting a “significant segment of the bar” for 
“routinely and patently pad[ding] bills and defraud[ing] clients”); Susan Saab 
Fortney, The Billable Hours Derby: Empirical Data on the Problems and Pressure Points, 33 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 171, 190 (2005) (noting the incentive to “overwork” files created 
by high billable hour requirements); Christine Parker & David Ruschena, The Pressures 
of Billable Hours: Lessons from a Survey of Billing Practices Inside Law Firms, 9 U. ST. THOMAS 
L.J. 619, 619 (2011) (reporting results from a survey of Australian lawyers that suggest 
lawyers were more likely to engage “in unethical behavior when they believe that such 
behavior is necessary” to meet certain performance standards, such as high billable 
hour requirements). 
 19  See infra Part I.B.i.; see also Guidelines for Reviewing Applications for 
Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses Filed Under United States Code by 
Attorneys in Larger Chapter 11 Cases, 78 Fed. Reg. 36248 (June 17, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ust/legacy/2013/06/28/Fee_Guidelines.
pdf [hereinafter Fee Guidelines] (The promulgation of new guidelines for reviewing 
professional fee applications by the United States Trustees’ office is an apparent 
acknowledgement of the problems that have long existed with the fee control 
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professional overcharging need not and should not occur.20  The 
following section explains how chapter 11’s fee control system works 
and why it is currently unable to prevent professional overcharging. 
A. How Chapter 11’s Fee Control System Works 
In an effort to control the cost of professional representation in 
bankruptcy cases, Congress created chapter 11’s fee control system.  
This system imposes numerous obligations on bankruptcy 
professionals.  These obligations arise both prior and subsequent to 
providing services.  For example, in bankruptcy cases, the bankruptcy 
court must review and approve each professional person’s or firm’s 
employment and the estate may not pay a professional’s fees without 
court approval.21  Section 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the 
standard governing the employment of most22 professional persons 
working for the debtor-in-possession23 or the trustee,24 and it provides 
 
process.).  But cf. Lubben, The Microeconomics of Chapter 11, supra note 3, at 87 
(suggesting that professional overcharging is not more prevalent inside of bankruptcy 
than outside of bankruptcy). 
 20  Some have argued that professional overcharging will remain impossible to 
prevent until all bankruptcy professionals adopt a value-based billing model.  See, e.g., 
Steven J. Harper, Opinion, The Tyranny of the Billable Hour, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/29/opinion/the-case-against-the-law-firm-
billable-hour.html?_r=0.  While this may be true, there appears to be no bankruptcy-
specific reason why bankruptcy professionals who bill by the hour outside of 
bankruptcy should be forced to adopt an alternative billing method inside of 
bankruptcy.  Cf. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979).  Instead, this Article takes 
as a starting point that some bankruptcy professionals, particularly attorneys, bill by 
the hour and offers a solution for sorting reasonable and necessary fees expenses from 
unreasonable and unnecessary fees and expenses.  See William G. Ross, The Ethics of 
Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 19 (1991) (noting that “most private 
practitioners seem relatively satisfied with time-based billing” and concluding, 
therefore, that “changes in billing procedures are likely to occur only if corporate 
counsel or clients demand them”). 
 21  11 U.S.C. § 330 (2011).  See Nancy Rapoport, The Case for Value Billing in Chapter 
11, 7 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 117, 121 (2012) [hereinafter Rapoport, Value Billing]; see also 
Kenneth A. Rosen & Barry Z. Bazian, Court’s Broad Power to Approve Appointment of Estate 
Professionals, 34 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 44, 44 (Mar. 2015) (describing the requirement of 
bankruptcy court approval as “unusual” because “in most other areas of law, a party 
has total freedom to choose its professionals and court approval is not required”).  
 22  Section 327(a) governs the employment of professionals doing bankruptcy-
related work, but other sections govern the employment of professionals for other 
purposes.  11 U.S.C. § 327(a).  See Rapoport, Value Billing, supra note 21, at 122; see also 
§ 327(e). 
 23  And perhaps for official committees as well.  See Rapoport, Value Billing, supra 
note 21, at 123 n.34. 
 24  In many Bankruptcy Code sections, references to the trustee are generally 
understood to also include the debtor-in-possession because the debtor-in-possession 
enjoys most of the rights and duties of the trustee where the debtor-in-possession has 
not been displaced by a trustee.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2009); see also Rapoport, Value 
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that: 
[T]he trustee, with the court’s approval, may employ one or 
more attorneys, accountants, appraisers, auctioneers, or 
other professional persons, that do not hold or represent an 
interest adverse to the estate, and that are disinterested 
persons, to represent or assist the trustee in carrying out the 
trustee’s duties under this title.25 
Professionals must file retention applications in order to determine 
whether they are “disinterested” and whether they “hold or represent” 
interests adverse to the estate.26  While the vast majority of professionals 
are retained by the debtor-in-possession, other parties-in-interest are 
also entitled to have the bankruptcy estate pay for their professional 
representation.27  For example, the estate pays the professional 
representatives of any official committees.28  Bankruptcy judges have 
broad discretion in determining whether to allow a professionals’ 
retention and, although most retention applications are uncontested,29 
the judges may deny retention sua sponte.30 
Once a professional’s employment is approved, that 
professional’s fees may be paid by the debtor’s estate as an 
administrative expense, pursuant to § 330.31  Section 330 provides that 
professionals may earn “reasonable compensation for actual, necessary 
services rendered.”32  This means that professionals may not charge an 
 
Billing, supra note 21, at 121; Philip A. Schovanec, Bankruptcy: The Sale of Property Under 
Section 363: The Validity of Sales Conducted Without Proper Notice, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 489, 
490–91 (1993). 
 25  11 U.S.C. § 327(a). 
 26  §§ 327, 330. 
 27  § 327(a); see Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Rise of the Financial Advisors: 
An Empirical Study of the Division of Professional Fees in Large Bankruptcies, 82 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 141, 142 (2008) (noting that approximately 80% of fees are paid to the debtors’ 
professionals, 19% of fees are paid to representatives of unsecured creditors, and only 
approximately 1% to professionals advising all other parties). 
 28  Section 1103 is relevant to the employment of professionals working for official 
committees.  In relevant part, § 1103 provides that official committees “may select and 
authorize the employment by such committee of one or more attorneys, accountants, 
or other agents, to represent or perform services for such committee.”  11 U.S.C. 
§ 1103 (2010).   
 29  MOVING FORWARD, supra note 18, at 934 (noting that “[o]bjections to proposed 
retention of professionals in chapter 11 cases are fairly rare” with between 16.5–34% 
objection rates, depending on case size).  
 30  See Rosen & Bazian, supra note 21. 
 31  Parties-in-interest are entitled to notice and the opportunity for a hearing 
before a retention application may be approved.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 330(b), 503 (2011); 
see also Rapoport, Value Billing, supra note 21, at 124–25. 
 32  Under § 330, attorneys’ fees are reviewed for their reasonableness after the 
representation has concluded.  See § 330(a)(1)(A). 
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unreasonable rate, and that professionals may only charge for services 
that were necessary to perform.33  The Bankruptcy Code provides 
additional guidance and prohibits compensation for “(i) unnecessary 
duplication of services; or (ii) services that were not—(I) reasonably 
likely to benefit the debtor’s estate; or (II) necessary to the 
administration of the case.”34  To aid courts in making these 
determinations, § 330 provides a list of factors for courts to consider 
when reviewing the fees of bankruptcy professionals, including but not 
limited to: 
(A) the time spent on such services; (B) the rates 
charged for such services; (C) whether the services were 
necessary to the administration of, or beneficial at the 
time at which the service was rendered toward the 
completion of, a case under this title; (D) whether the 
services were performed within a reasonable amount of 
time commensurate with the complexity, importance, 
and nature of the problem, issue, or task addressed; (E) 
with respect to a professional person, whether the person 
is board certified or otherwise has demonstrated skill 
and experience in the bankruptcy field; and (F) whether 
the compensation is reasonable based on the customary 
compensation charged by comparably skilled 
practitioners in cases other than cases under this title.35 
 
 33  A reasonable rate may still be a facially large hourly rate.  For example, partners 
at some of the most prominent bankruptcy law firms earn in excess of $1000 per hour.  
See David Lat, Legal Fee Voyeurism: American Airlines’ Big-Time Bankruptcy Bills, ABOVE THE 
LAW (Oct. 12, 2010, 2:03 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2012/10/legal-fee-voyeurism-
american-airliness-big-time-bankruptcy-bills/ (reporting that at least twelve Weil 
Gotshal attorneys in the American Airlines bankruptcy case billed $1000 per hour or 
more); see also Ashby Jones, On Billing Over $1,000 an Hour: ‘If You Can Get It, Get It,’ 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2011, 9:27 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/02/23/on-
billing-over-1000-an-hour-if-you-can-get-it-get-it/; Nelson D. Schwartz & Julie Creswell, 
Who Knew Bankruptcy Paid So Well?, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/02/business/02workout.html?pagewanted=all 
(“At several firms, including Weil and Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, partners 
now charge $1,000 an hour or more for their bankruptcy services.”); Debra Cassens 
Weiss, More Top Lawyers Break Through $1,000 Hourly Billing Barrier, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 23, 
2011, 12:50 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/more_top_lawyers_break 
_through_1000_hourly_billing_barrier/.  In addition, investment bankers are 
commonly paid hundreds of thousands of dollars per month and can also qualify for 
liberally defined “success fees” that exceed millions of dollars at the conclusion of a 
case.  See, e.g., Rapoport, Value Billing, supra note 21, at 120 n.20 (discussing the 
proposed retention application for debtors’ financial advisors in In re Energy Partners, 
Ltd., No. 09-32957, 2009 WL 2970393, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2009)).  Other 
professionals may be similarly well-compensated. 
 34  See § 330(a)(4)(A).  
 35  See § 330(a)(3); see also In re Channel Master Holdings, Inc., 309 B.R. 855, 861 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2004).  
BRUCKNER (DO NOT DELETE) 1/28/2016  12:24 PM 
370 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:361 
To facilitate judicial review of the reasonableness and 
appropriateness of their fees,36 professionals typically file so-called fee 
applications.  Fee applications should “contain sufficient information 
about the case and the applicant so that the court, the creditors, and 
the United States Trustee can review it without searching for relevant 
information in other documents.”37  Fee Controllers should approve 
all of the compensation requested in a fee application only if 
professionals accurately and adequately describe the services they 
rendered, and only request “reasonable compensation for actual, 
necessary services rendered.”38  By contrast, if professionals seek 
unreasonable compensation or compensation for services not actually 
rendered or necessary for the estate, Fee Controllers should not 
approve the requested compensation.39  In order to make these 
determinations, chapter 11’s fee control system depends primarily on 
Fee Controllers to review professional fee applications and thereby 
catch and prevent any overcharging. 
Apparently, Congress also expected that the estate’s creditors 
would assist with the fee control process by reviewing the professional 
fee applications and objecting to professional overcharging.40  That 
expectation, however, appears unsatisfied, as creditors and other 
parties-in-interest object to fee applications relatively infrequently.41  At 
least three reasons may explain the limited participation in chapter 
 
 36  And to comply with guidelines promulgated by the office of the United States 
Trustee and adopted in many bankruptcy courts.  See Rapoport, Value Billing, supra 
note 21, at 126; see also Fee Guidelines, supra note 19. 
 37  Regulations Relating to the Bankruptcy Reform Acts of 1978 and 1994, 28 C.F.R. 
§ 58, app. A(a) (2010); see Rapoport, Value Billing, supra note 21, at 126 (citing 28 C.F.R. 
§ 58). 
 38  § 330(a)(1)(A). 
 39  See, e.g., MOVING FORWARD, supra note 18, at 946 (noting that a professional’s 
fees, if retained under 11 U.S.C. § 328, can only be reconsidered after they have been 
incurred, if the “terms and conditions of the fee structure ‘prove to have been 
improvident in light of developments not capable of being anticipated at the time of 
the fixing of such terms and conditions.’”) (quoting § 328(a)).  
 40  See Charles J. Tabb, The Future of Chapter 11, 44 S.C. L. REV. 791, 798 (1993) 
(“The problem of excessive professional fees” has captured Congressional attention.).  
 41  See LYNN M. LOPUCKI & JOSEPH W. DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES IN CORPORATE 
BANKRUPTCIES: DATA, ANALYSIS, AND EVALUATION 170 (2011) [hereinafter LOPUCKI & 
DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES] (reporting that approximately only 20% of fee 
applications receive any objections, and the vast majority of those objections are filed 
by the United States Trustee and involve small dollar sums); see also MOVING FORWARD, 
supra note 18, at 934 (noting that, in a random sample, only 10% of fee applications 
filed by debtor’s lead counsel received a formal objection).  But see G. RAY WARNER & 
KEITH J. SHAPIRO, AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE NATIONAL REPORT ON PROFESSIONAL 
COMPENSATION IN BANKRUPTCY CASES 57 (1991) (“[F]ee applications are being 
subjected to substantial scrutiny.”). 
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11’s fee control system.  First, objections are expensive to prepare and 
prosecute.  Even worse, these costs are borne by the objecting party, 
but successful objections do not necessarily inure to their benefit.42  
Second, parties may be concerned that an objection will derail 
unrelated negotiations.43  Third, some have alleged that a “conspiracy 
of silence” exists among bankruptcy professionals.44  In short, this third 
reason argues that the existence of repeat players in corporate 
bankruptcy cases creates incentives that span individual cases, 
encouraging parties-in-interest (and their professionals) not to object 
to each other’s fees in any one particular case because of concerns 
about future retribution.45 
Without the participation of creditors, the burden of scrutinizing 
and, where appropriate, objecting to fee applications tends to fall to 
the Assistant United States Trustee assigned to a particular case.46  
Objections by United States Trustees’ offices tend to involve violations 
of narrow, technical rules rather than a substantive second-guessing of 
the work done by bankruptcy professionals.47  Thus, courts are largely 
left to review the work of bankruptcy professionals without the 
assistance Congress expected would be rendered by creditors, and with 
only limited assistance from United States Trustees’ offices.48  Without 
 
 42  Baker, supra note 17, at 57–58. 
 43  Corporate bankruptcy cases often involve extensive negotiations among 
professionals.  Unfortunately, “attacking a fee application can be a bit of an atom 
bomb, when you want a low caliber pistol.”  See id. at 58 (quoting Robert Levine, 
Partner at Davis Polk & Wardwell (quoted in Barbara Franklin, Passing Fee Inspection: 
Bankruptcy Bar Adjusts to Reduce Costs, N.Y. L.J., May 14, 1992, at 5)).  
 44  See LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES, supra note 41, at xx-xxi; see also 
Baker, supra note 17, at 58 (“[C]ourts often bemoan the lack of participation in the 
fee process.”); McKenzie, supra note 3, at 882 (referring to a “‘ring’ of closely knit 
lawyers who wielded excessive control at the expense of creditors” in a bankruptcy 
case) (citing Susan Block-Lieb, What Congress Had to Say: Legislative History as a Rehearsal 
of Congressional Responses to Stern v. Marshall, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 55, 62–63 (2012)). 
 45  See McKenzie, supra note 3, at 882, 883–84 (discussing the perception of self-
dealing by bankruptcy lawyers and suggesting that “the hint of corruption that 
attached to the process” helped retard the prompt development of a more expansive 
bankruptcy law); see also SOL STEIN, BANKRUPTCY: A FEAST FOR LAWYERS 60 (1999); Nancy 
B. Rapoport, Rethinking Professional Fees in Chapter 11 Cases, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 263, 269 
(2010) (noting the possibility of a “conspiracy of silence” among professionals who 
regularly appear in chapter 11 cases to avoid challenging each other’s fees); Schwartz 
& Creswell, supra note 33 (“Lawyers were reluctant to challenge their peers, fearing 
retaliation.”). 
 46  See McKenzie, supra note 3, at 883 (referring to the United States Trustee as a 
Congressionally-appointed “watchdog in bankruptcy cases”).  
 47  See LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES, supra note 41, at 131; see also 
MOVING FORWARD, supra note 18, at 934 (the United States Trustee objected in about 
3% of all cases in one study and more than 13% in the largest cases).  
 48  Most bankruptcy judges will also have the assistance of one or more law clerks. 
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a robust pool of insightful objections to focus their attention on 
instances of potential professional overcharging, Fee Controllers are 
unlikely to effectively review professional fee applications.49  
Unsurprisingly, reductions in professional fee applications tend to 
involve small dollar amounts, if any reductions are made at all.50 
Even with objections to focus Fee Controllers’ attention, fee 
review would often be an enormous task; without them, it may be an 
impossible one.51  In a large corporate bankruptcy case, a bankruptcy 
court typically receives fee applications from twelve to sixteen 
professional firms every three months,52 and fee applications are 
usually thirty or more pages.53  Assuming there are twelve professional 
firms each filing a thirty-page application every three months for two 
years, Fee Controllers must closely scrutinize 2880 pages of “single-
spaced, small font lines of time entries and expense details” over the 
course of the case.54  Add only four more professional firms, and Fee 
 
 49  At least three reasons have been put forward to explain why parties do not 
participate in chapter 11’s fee control system.  See supra text accompanying notes 42–
45. 
 50  See Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, The Determinants of Professional Fees in 
Large Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases, 1 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 135 (2004) 
[hereinafter LoPucki & Doherty, Determinants]. 
 51  Impossibility becomes a more serious proposition in bankruptcy mega-cases 
even though fee examiners, committees, or auditors are appointed in many of these 
cases.  Even with this additional assistance, however, fee applications in mega-cases are 
not reduced significantly.  See LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES, supra note 41, 
at xx; cf. Lupica & Rapoport, supra note 6 (describing the differences between fee 
examiners, committees and auditors).  Although fee examiners might be expected to 
have a deterrent effect, empirical evidence suggests that cases involving fee examiners 
tend to have higher than expected fees.  LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES, supra 
note 41, at xx. 
 52  See, e.g., Amended Guidelines for Fees and Disbursements for Professionals in the 
Southern District of New York, U.S. BANKR. CT. S.D.N.Y. (June 17, 2013), 
http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2016-1-a-Guidelines.pdf; see also 
Zolfo, Cooper & Co. v. Sunbeam-Oster Co., 50 F.3d 253, 255–56 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(Seventeen legal, financial and accounting firms were each submitting monthly fee 
applications for the court’s review and approval.); LoPucki & Doherty, Professional 
Overcharging, supra note 16, at xx (reporting an average of twelve professionals per case 
in large corporate reorganization cases with plans confirmed between 1998 and 2003, 
with the twenty-six most recent cases averaging more than sixteen professionals per 
case); Rapoport, Value Billing, supra note 21 (naming the professionals normally hired 
in every large chapter 11 case); Procedures for Monthly Compensation and Reimbursement of 
Expenses, U.S. BANKR. CT. S.D.N.Y. (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/ 
sites/default/files/2016-1-c-procedures.pdf. 
 53  See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 601 n.1 (3d Cir. 1984) (Becker, 
J., concurring) (noting the “massive set of fee applications, which, if stacked in one 
pile, would amount to a pillar of paper 27 feet high”); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 2016(a); 
In re Robinson, 368 B.R. 492, 498 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007). 
 54  Rapoport, Value Billing, supra note 21, at 128; see also Clifford J. White III & 
Walter W. Theus, Jr., Professional Fees Under the Bankruptcy Code: Where Have We Been, and 
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Controllers will have to scrutinize 3840 pages (and hundreds of 
thousands of lines of time and expense entries) instead.  And in the 
largest cases, there may be “tens of thousands of pages of fee 
applications.”55 
Fee control is challenging because Fee Controllers must analyze 
these thousands of pages very closely.  Mere skimming is not likely to 
be sufficient.  To uncover instances of overcharging, Fee Controllers 
must review these fee applications to look for patterns, double-check 
the fees and expenses against any relevant local rules or guidelines, 
cross-check time entries across billers and across professionals, and 
then follow up with professionals to discuss facially excessive or 
unreasonable charges.56  Some of this work could likely be automated, 
but Fee Controllers do not appear to have the tools at their disposal to 
do so.57  In addition, some aspects of fee review may require a Fee 
Controllers’ informed judgment in order to determine if the fees and 
expenses that have been requested are appropriate.58 
Fee control would be a challenging task for a small group of Fee 
Controllers even assuming every bankruptcy professional was 
scrupulous in their billing practices.59  But, as discussed in the next 
section, evidence suggests that bankruptcy professionals do not always 
exercise appropriate billing judgment.60  Instead, some bankruptcy 
 
Where Are We Going?, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 22, 22 (Jan. 2010).  
 55  White & Theus Jr., supra note 54. 
 56  Brief for the Neutral Fee Examiners in Support of Neither Party as Amicus 
Curiae at 18, Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO, L.L.C., 135 S. Ct. 2158 (2015) (No. 14-
103), http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/baker-botts-l-l-p-v-asarco-l-l-c/ 
[hereinafter Brief for the Neutral Fee Examiners]; see also Lupica & Rapoport, supra 
note 6 (discussing the various methods that fee examiners use for doing this work on 
behalf of the court and the estate). 
 57  Some fee auditors do have specialized software to automate this work, but they 
are not hired in every case.  See Lupica & Rapoport, supra note 6. 
 58  But see Bernstein et al., infra note 264, at 314 (discussing how a Find-Fix-Verify 
system can allow non-experts to produce expert-quality answers). 
 59  See, e.g., In re Jefsaba, Inc., 172 B.R. 786, 799 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) (expecting 
that “unproductive time will be written off”); In re Wildman, 72 B.R. 700, 707 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 1987) (“[B]efore performing any service . . . [professionals must] first 
scrupulously weigh and assess the necessity and propriety of each task for which he will 
be seeking compensation.”); see also James P. Schratz, Billing Guidelines and Fee Disputes: 
A Case Law Review, 18 TRIAL DIPLOMACY J. 159, 161 (1995), 
http://jimschratz.com/Billing_Guidelines_article.pdf. 
 60  By “billing judgment,” bankruptcy courts seem to mean that they expect 
professionals will “writ[e] off unproductive research time, duplicative services, 
redundant costs precipitated by overstaffing, or other expenses with regard to which 
the professional generally assumes the cost as overhead in corresponding non-
bankruptcy matters, or for which analogous non-bankruptcy clients typically decline 
to pay.”  In re Busy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs., Inc., 19 F.3d 833, 856 (3d Cir. 1994).  See also In 
re Jefsaba, Inc., 172 B.R. at 799; Hensley v. Eckerhort, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983) (stating 
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professionals may occasionally bill the estate inappropriately.  
Unfortunately, it may be that no one catches this overcharging. 
B. An Overcharged Estate and Sub-Optimal Fee Review 
i. Empirical Evidence Suggests Professional Overcharging 
May Be Pervasive 
Chapter 11’s fee control system is intended to do two things: (i) 
prevent professional firms from being paid for more than the cost of 
their reasonable and necessary services, and (ii) deter bankruptcy 
professionals from performing services that are unlikely to benefit the 
estate.61  To accomplish these goals, Fee Controllers should pay 
particular attention to two issues.  First, Fee Controllers must identify 
services that were unreasonable or unnecessary to perform.  Second, 
Fee Controllers must identify when necessary services were performed 
but have been billed at unreasonable rates.62  If the Fee Controllers can 
prevent professionals from being compensated for these types of non-
compensable services, bankruptcy professionals will be more likely to 
self-regulate in future cases.  Unfortunately, Fee Controllers generally 
do not prevent either type of overcharging and therefore professionals 
do not, by their own admissions, adequately self-regulate. 
Empirical research suggests that bankruptcy professionals 
routinely overcharge their clients.63  To be clear, fraud, abuse, or 
malfeasance should not be assumed every time a professional’s fees or 
expenses are disallowed.64  Fees and expenses may be disallowed 
because of legitimate disagreements between professional firms and 
Fee Controllers over appropriate staffing models,65 the appropriate 
 
lawyers are expected to “make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours 
that are excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary”); Schratz, supra note 59. 
 61  See MOVING FORWARD, supra note 18, at 945 (counsel are expected to note in 
their fee applications what time has been written off “in order to demonstrate the 
proper use of billing judgment”). 
 62  See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4) (2011).  
 63  See, e.g., Ross, supra note 20, at 15; see also Bogus, supra note 18; Fortney, supra 
note 18; Parker & Ruschena, supra note 18; cf. LoPucki & Doherty, Determinants, supra 
note 50 (focusing on the largest public company bankruptcy cases); LoPucki & 
Doherty, Professional Overcharging, supra note 16 (same).  But see Lubben, The 
Microeconomics of Chapter 11, supra note 3, at 90 (suggesting that staffing patterns at law 
firms raise potential issues but because those issues appear similar inside and outside 
of bankruptcy, this article claims that nothing is particularly wrong in bankruptcy). 
 64  Parker & Ruschena, supra note 18, at 621 (noting that “[e]ven in the absence 
of fraud, clients run the risk of paying for inefficient lawyering, costs incurred in 
training junior lawyers, turnover, and aggressive time recording”); see also Schwartz & 
Creswell, supra note 33.  
 65  See Lubben, The Microeconomics of Chapter 11, supra note 3, at 90. 
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charges for reasonable and necessary work, or whether work was 
reasonable or necessary to perform at all.  But in surveys of non-
bankruptcy attorneys,66 many lawyers readily admit to personally 
overcharging their clients, with some admitting outright fraud and 
others simply admitting to inefficiency.67  An even larger percentage of 
those surveyed believe that their fellow attorneys overcharge their own 
clients even more regularly.68  For example, one survey found that a 
majority of lawyers believed that, occasionally or frequently, “lawyers 
deliberately ‘pad’ their hours to bill clients for work that they do not 
actually perform.”69  Almost two-thirds of this survey’s participants 
(64.5%) admitted specific knowledge of lawyers padding their hours 
by charging for work they did not perform.70  Of course, “padding” 
often seems to be just a euphemism for fraud. 
In addition to “padding” their bills, this same survey found that 
law firm staffing models contributed to bills that would appear higher 
than appropriate.  In this survey, 29% of lawyers agreed that they or 
other lawyers were regularly billing clients at attorney rates for work 
that could have been done by secretaries or paralegals.71  Although this 
is less egregious than charging for work that was never performed, it is 
still unlikely to be compensable under § 330.72  Professor Stephen 
 
 66  There is no reason to suspect that a survey of bankruptcy attorneys would return 
different results.  The results may also be generalizable to all bankruptcy professionals.  
Moreover, a lot of work done in bankruptcy cases is not bankruptcy-specific work.  As 
a result, it seems entirely appropriate to extrapolate from surveys of non-bankruptcy 
lawyers. 
 67  Parker & Ruschena, supra note 18, at 642 (finding that 23% of survey 
participants claimed to have actually observed instances of “padding” bills for work 
never performed); see also Ross, supra note 20, at 15 (fraudulently inflating hours is 
“especially common”); cf. Lisa Lerman, A Double Standard for Lawyer Dishonesty: Billing 
Fraud Versus Misappropriation, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 847, 882 (1999) (calling it 
“commonplace” when lawyers pad their hours). 
 68  Ross, supra note 20, at 16; see also Parker & Ruschena, supra note 18, at 642 
(noting that 34% of attorneys surveyed reported concerns about the billing practices 
of other members of their law firm). 
 69  Ross, supra note 20, at 93.  
 70  Id. at 16. 
 71  Id. at 94 app. A (The results under question 18 show that 29% of work currently 
performed by lawyers could, to a “moderate” or “substantial” degree, be replaced by 
work performed by secretaries or paralegals.).  Ensuring the appropriate professional 
does a particular task is also something that Fee Controllers must monitor.  See, e.g., In 
re Jefsaba, Inc., 172 B.R. 786, 796 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) (stating that court should 
investigate whether the “appropriate professional or paraprofessional is assigned to 
the various tasks performed”); In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 593 (3d 
Cir. 1984) (finding that more than 5000 hours of partner time should have been 
assigned to associates and refusing to approve the requested fees as a result).  Cf. 
Lubben, The Microeconomics of Chapter 11, supra note 3, at 34. 
 72  Section 330(a)(3)(B) requires bankruptcy courts to consider “the rates charged 
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Lubben’s empirical work also supports the contention that law firm 
staffing models could be contributing to unnecessarily high legal 
bills.73  In his work, Lubben notes that much of the expense in 
bankruptcy cases is based on the billings of mid-level attorneys, 
potentially suggesting that firms “lacked sufficient junior attorneys and 
assigned the work to mid-level associates” instead.74 
At a minimum, this evidence suggests that some law firms are not 
overly concerned with limiting their costs and discounting their bills 
when they fail to do so.  But it may also support the more sweeping 
indictment leveled by some commentators that “many attorneys who 
bill by the hour have turned to engaging in deceptive billing 
practices.”75  Particularly because it seems reasonable to suspect that 
the surveyed professionals were under-reporting instances of 
overcharging.76 
Additional studies, case law, and anecdotal evidence support the 
contention that legal professionals sometimes overcharge their 
clients.77  For example, Professors LoPucki and Doherty claimed that 
some professionals in mega-bankruptcy cases may not always exercise 
appropriate billing judgment, and that professionals’ “billing 
opportunity” could explain much of the apparent professional 
overcharging they observed in their study.78  Their argument, which 
aligns with the views of at least some judges, is that professionals should 
voluntarily reduce their fees when, for example, the firm engages in 
unnecessary research.79  This does not appear to be happening, 
 
for such services” when determining whether to approve professional compensation 
requests. This seems to require that firms use the least expensive service provider.  11 
U.S.C. § 330(a)(3)(B) (2011). 
 73  Lubben, The Microeconomics of Chapter 11, supra note 3, at 90. 
 74  Id. 
 75  Hourly Billing for Lawyers’ Time: The Legal Profession’s “Not So Hidden Shame”?, 
LEGAL BILL AUDIT BLOG (June 27, 2014), http://legalbillaudit.com/hourly-billing-
lawyers-time-legal-professions-hidden-shame/; see also AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA COMMISSION 
ON BILLABLE HOURS REPORT 2001–2002 1, 43 (2002), http://ilta.personifycloud.com/ 
webfiles/productfiles/914311/FMPG4_ABABillableHours2002.pdf (The hourly 
billing model encourages questionable billing practices, including billing for 
unnecessary research or even outright padding.  “These are not imaginary fears.”).   
 76  See Bogus, supra note 18, at 927 n.148 (exploring various reasons—all related to 
Ross’s survey methodology—why his results likely under-reported instances of 
padding). 
 77  See Ross, supra note 20, at 15 (anecdotal examples of fraud or otherwise inflated 
bills). 
 78  See LoPucki & Doherty, Professional Overcharging, supra note 16. Cf. Lubben, 
Direct Costs, supra note 3 (finding that big cases cost more, but acknowledging that size 
could be a proxy for case complexity). 
 79  See, e.g., In re Busy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs., Inc., 19 F.3d 833, 855–56 (3d Cir. 1994); 
see also In re Jefsaba, Inc., 172 B.R. 786, 799 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) (court expects that 
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particularly in the largest cases.  Instead, professional firms appear to 
overbill the estate for unnecessary services.80  In their view, 
overcharging may be more pronounced in the largest bankruptcy cases 
because there are more opportunities to perform unnecessary work.81  
In other words, professionals may charge more in large cases simply 
because there are more opportunities to do work related to a case, even 
though that additional work is not necessary to perform.82  Professor 
LoPucki, however, has noted that the existence of billing opportunities 
does not necessarily suggest that firms are acting opportunistically, but 
it does create the possibility for opportunism.83 
A few notable decisions also exist in which judges have trimmed 
excessive professional fees while colorfully describing the deplorable 
behavior of particular bankruptcy professionals.84  For example, one 
 
“unproductive time will be written off”). 
 80  See LoPucki & Doherty, Professional Overcharging, supra note 16, at 1012; see also 
Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and Expense Fraud by Lawyers, 12 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 231 (1999) (suggesting that when lawyers are servicing large 
clients and expect to deliver them large bills, making “small modifications in time 
sheets or expense vouchers [can] seem insignificant or permissible”).  
 81  Compare LoPucki & Doherty, Professional Overcharging, supra note 16, at 1012 
(noting evidence of billing opportunities for professional firms in the largest corporate 
bankruptcy cases), with Hirsch, supra note 14, at 1334 n.39 (citing cases cutting 
professional fees for duplicating work, performing unreasonable work, or for billing 
time that was “ill spent”). 
 82  See Lerman, supra note 80, at 231, 245 (suggesting that a lot of overcharging is 
not simply a failure of judgment but reflects “shameless, pre-meditated chronic 
thievery”); see generally Ross, supra note 20 (discussing survey results about the “rich 
opportunities for unscrupulous attorneys to overcharge clients, since the amount of 
time that needs to be spent on [various tasks] is highly subjective”).  But see Lupica & 
Rapoport, supra note 6 (suggesting that the authors operate on the presumption that 
professionals do not intend to overcharge the estate); Claire Hamner Matturro, 
Auditing Attorneys’ Bills: Legal and Ethical Pitfalls of a Growing Trend, 78 FLA. BAR J., May 
1999, at 14 (claiming that “[c]ommentators have noted that the majority of attorneys 
are ethical in their billing practices”).  
 83  Private correspondence with Lynn M. LoPucki, Professor of Law, UCLA Law 
School (on file with Author). 
 84  See, e.g., Lederman Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Trustee, 997 F.2d 1321, 1323–24 (10th 
Cir. 1993); see also Keate v. Miller, 95 F.3d 713, 715 (8th Cir. 1996) (denying attorney’s 
fees for work that counsel should have realized could not benefit the estate); In re Fine 
Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 572–73 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting that the bankruptcy 
court reduced fee applications by approximately 80% because it found that the fee 
petitions were “grossly excessive on their face” and that attorneys “wasted hours on 
useless tasks,” duplicated efforts, and masked “outright padding”); In re Bank of New 
England Corp., 142 B.R. 584, 585–86 (D. Mass. 1992) (reducing fees by 42% despite 
noting problems with less than 2% of the relevant time entries because “courts should 
not spend . . . nonexistent Court resources to track down every entry, correlate them 
against other fee applications, and . . . delete those entries insufficiently 
substantiated”) (second alternation in original); Real v. The Continental Grp., Inc. 
653 F. Supp. 736, 741 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (court reduced fees by 40% because of, among 
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court refused to approve certain professional fee requests because 
those professionals treated the debtor like a “cash cow to be milked to 
death.”85  Other courts have labeled professionals as “hogs” that ought 
to be slaughtered.86  While these cases suggest that chapter 11’s fee 
control system does work occasionally, courts may fail to catch many 
instances of professional overcharging.87  But even in those cases where 
some meaningful review does occur and fees are trimmed, fees are 
rarely trimmed significantly.  In LoPucki and Doherty’s sample, they 
found that the median fee cut was less than 4%, which seems too small, 
given the survey results about professional overcharging. 
The evidence seems indisputable that some professionals engage 
in outright fraud; others do not defraud their clients, but nor do they 
exercise the degree of billing judgment, including writing off 
unproductive time that the Code, commentators, and courts expect.88  
One instance where lawyers seem particularly likely to overcharge their 
clients is when they are repurposing work done for a former client for 
use by a new client.89  For example, assume that two secured creditors 
retain a law firm on an hourly basis in a chapter 11 case, and that both 
clients want to file objections to the debtor’s plan of reorganization.  
Client A retains the law firm first and pays $10,000 for the work, based 
 
other things, “inflated billing”); In re Patronek, 121 B.R. 728, 734 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 
1990) (reviewing and disallowing fees because the bill was “clearly inflated” and the 
work was likely “concluded in a matter of seconds”).  
 85  In re Chas A. Stevens & Co., 105 B.R. 866, 871–72 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989); see also 
In re Energy Partners, Ltd., 409 B.R. 211, 237 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).  
 86  In re Energy Partners, Ltd., 409 B.R. at 237.  “The underlying principle is, if you 
can get it, get it.”  Jones, supra note 33 (quoting famed bankruptcy lawyer Harvey Miller 
on billing rates).  See also McKenzie, supra note 3, at 858–59 (discussing criticism of fee 
awards in bankruptcy cases). 
 87  See Ross, supra note 20, at 28 (“Attorneys currently engage in a number of 
practices which waste time and therefore unnecessarily inflate client bills.”); Schratz, 
supra note 59, at 159 (“[There] can be little doubt that deceptive attorney billing is a 
significant problem.”).  Professor (and sometimes fee examiner) Nancy Rapoport has 
suggested that bankruptcy firms will sometimes “send eight people to a hearing 
because there is an outside chance they might have to speak at that hearing” and if a 
firm did this for a non-bankruptcy client, that client would “go ballistic.”  Schwartz & 
Creswell, supra note 33. 
 88  See id.  See also Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate 
Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements, 69 UMKC L. 
REV. 239, 253 (2000) (noting an absence of written guidelines within law firms on 
billing practices, and suggesting this absence can “lead to questionable billing 
practices by some associates”). 
 89  Parker & Ruschena, supra note 18, at 626 (discussing the practice of recycling 
previously completed work for new clients and the impulse to bill the second client in 
excess of the hours expended to complete that work); see also Fortney, supra note 88, 
at 257 (discussing ABA Formal Ethics Op. 93-379 and its condemnation of recycling 
work). 
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on the firm’s hourly rates multiplied by the number of hours 
expended.90  If the law firm then “recycles” the work it did for Client A 
when preparing Client B’s objection, it now faces a choice.  Should it 
charge Client B $10,000 or should it charge Client B only for those 
hours reasonably expended in modifying Client A’s objection to suit 
Client B’s needs?  Although it is widely agreed that the former option 
is likely both unethical and fraudulent,91 approximately one quarter of 
surveyed lawyers suggested that it is either ethical to charge Client B a 
premium or that they would do so notwithstanding the ethical issues 
presented.92  If recycling Client A’s work product for Client B resulted 
in time savings, that time savings must be passed along to Client B 
under an hourly fee arrangement.  Fee Controllers are charged with 
ensuring this happens. 
To sum up, empirical evidence suggests that some professionals 
charge clients for work never performed (i.e., “padding” their bills) or 
unnecessary work performed (i.e., “milking” client files), or charge 
higher-than-appropriate rates because they are not using the lowest-
cost provider for that work.93  The next section will explore why chapter 
11’s fee system cannot be expected to deter or prevent more of this 
professional overcharging without being overhauled. 
 
 
 
 90  This is known as the “lodestar” method of computing appropriate professional 
fee requests.  See, e.g., Blum v. Stensen, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984); Stalnaker v. DLC Ltd., 
376 F.3d 819, 825 (8th Cir. 2004) (“The lodestar method, calculated as the number of 
hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, is the appropriate 
calculation of fees [under 11 U.S.C. § 330].”).  
 91  And certainly a violation of 11 U.S.C. § 330 (2011).  The ABA also condemns 
the practice.  See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-379 
(1993), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/genpractice/ 
resources/costrecovery/ABA_CommEthics_Opinion.authcheckdam.pdf; see also 
Fortney, supra note 88, at 257.  
 92  Parker & Ruschena, supra note 18, at 648–50; Ross, supra note 20, at 58.  See also 
Fortney, supra note 88, at 258–59 (noting the percentage of survey respondents who 
admitted to double-billing for recycled work varies with firm size). 
 93  Not only did 20–25% of surveyed lawyers freely admit to “padding” their bills, 
but approximately two–thirds suggested that attorneys regularly charge for work 
completed by persons more senior (and thus more expensive) than was required by 
the task.  In addition an overwhelming majority (64.5%) claimed to “know some” or 
“know many” lawyers who “‘pad’ their hours to bill clients for work that they do not 
actually perform.”  See Ross, supra note 20, at 15.  See also MOVING FORWARD, supra note 
18, at 943 (noting that whether a matter is one that should be performed by attorneys 
or by paraprofessionals remains subject to “a great deal of discussion”); Parker & 
Ruschena, supra note 18, at 650. 
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ii. Sub-Optimal Fee Review Is the Norm in Chapter 11 
The potential for professional overcharging arises because 
chapter 11’s fee control system is not as effective as it ought to be, nor 
as effective as it could be.  An effective fee control system should be 
able to regularly identify inappropriate professional bills and, where 
appropriate, reduce the fees and expenses of estate-paid 
professionals.94  Yet, chapter 11’s fee control system appears to neither 
sufficiently control nor deter professional overcharging.95  For 
example, one study found that approximately 96% of fees requested 
were approved in forty-three of the forty-eight mega-bankruptcy cases 
examined.96  This same study found that the median reduction in fees 
in Delaware—where many of the largest bankruptcy cases are filed—
was less than one percent.97  To the extent that professional 
overcharging is a widespread problem, the lack of fee reductions 
suggests the flawed nature of chapter 11’s fee control system.98  This 
may help explain why the cost of professional representation in the 
largest corporate bankruptcy cases has grown at more than five times 
 
 94  Some scholars have argued that the opposite may be true and that bankruptcy 
professionals have a greater ability to bill opportunistically and may therefore engage 
in more, rather than less, inappropriate billing.  See LoPucki & Doherty, Professional 
Overcharging, supra note 16.  In large law firms, attorneys are generally expected to bill 
their clients for more than 2000 hours a year and, in the face of such expectations, 
“there are bound to be temptations to exaggerate the hours actually put in.”  William 
H. Rehnquist, C.J., Dedicatory Address: The Legal Profession¸62 IND. L.J. 151, 155 (1987); 
see also Bogus, supra note 18, at 925 (describing lawyers reported annual billings as 
“quite literally, incredible”).  See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 75; Fortney, supra 
note 18; Parker & Ruschena, supra note 18; Milton C. Regan, Corporate Norms and 
Contemporary Law Firm Practice, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 931 (2002). 
 95  LoPucki & Doherty, Professional Overcharging, supra note 16 (suggesting that 
chapter 11’s fee control system does not successfully control the cost of professional 
services). 
 96  It is possible that a less-than 4% reduction (or 1% in Delaware) adequately 
captures all of the unreasonable or excessive bills that the survey data alludes to.  See 
LoPucki & Doherty, Determinants, supra note 50, at 114, 135.  This hypothesis, however, 
seems unlikely.  Rather, it seems more likely that our current fee control system is 
failing to identify instances of professional overcharging and therefore failing to 
adequately control it by cutting fee requests.  See supra text accompanying notes 66–
75.   
 97  See LoPucki & Doherty, Determinants, supra note 50, at 114, 135. 
 98  The promulgation of new fee review guidelines by the U.S. Trustees’ office 
supports the view that the fee control system has been broken.  See generally Fee 
Guidelines, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/ust/fee-guidelines (last 
visited Nov. 29, 2015); see also Schwartz & Creswell, supra note 33 (“‘There’s clearly 
pressure on people to create more revenue,’ says Robert White, a former bankruptcy 
partner at O’Melveny & Myers who retired in 2006 after practicing for 35 years.”); 
Rapoport, Value Billing, supra note 21, at 128; White & Theus Jr., supra note 54.  But see 
Hirsch, supra note 14, at 1334 (claiming that “bankruptcy courts routinely slash 
requested fees”). 
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the rate of inflation in recent years.99 
To fix chapter 11’s fee control system, one must understand why 
Fee Controllers do not adequately control professional overcharging.  
Outside of bankruptcy, clients are expected to take the laboring oar in 
controlling the cost of their professional assistants and ensuring the 
appropriateness of any fees charged.  For example, before hiring a law 
firm, the client may host a so-called “beauty contest” where it can try to 
ensure that it is hiring a professional firm with the right expertise to 
address its needs and negotiate billing rates.100  After a bill for 
professional services arrives, clients outside of bankruptcy will often 
scrutinize that bill carefully, sometimes with the help of a fee auditor, 
and may question potentially inappropriate or especially large 
entries.101  Outside of bankruptcy, if the client does not control these 
costs, no court or other third party is likely to interfere with its decision 
to overpay for professional services.102 
In bankruptcy cases, clients evidence less concern with 
professional fees than their non-bankruptcy counterparts.103  They 
appear less careful in their initial hiring decisions, and less aggressive 
when negotiating for discounts or scrutinizing the bills of their 
professionals and pushing back against large or questionable charges.  
A variety of reasons for these differences have been advanced,104 
 
 99  LoPucki & Doherty, Professional Overcharging, supra note 16.  Of course, some 
portion of this increase may relate to an increase in legitimate work.  Cases are—
undoubtedly—larger and more complex than ever before.  
 100  “The law firm beauty contest is an orchestrated interviewing process.  The 
company is the buyer.  The law firm is the seller.  The process allows each to take the 
measure of the other before becoming engaged.”  Wendeen H. Eolis, Beauty Pageants, 
EOLIS, http://eolis.com/content/beauty-pageants (last visited Nov. 22, 2015); see also 
Lerman, supra note 80, at 222 (“Corporate clients that once each had a deep and stable 
relationship with a single firm now solicit bids from law firms for various chunks of 
legal work.”). 
 101  See, e.g., Rapoport, Value Billing, supra note 21, at 130–31. 
 102  See Baker, supra note 17 (suggesting that if the person paying the bill doesn’t 
care, no one else should either); see also Schratz, supra note 59, at 164 (citing In re 
Associated Grocers of Colorado, Inc., 137 B.R. 413 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990)); cf. Third 
Cir. Task Force, supra note 17 (stating that the court has a role in fee control because 
there is “a significant conflict of interest between client and attorney” once the work 
is done and the attorney seeks money that would otherwise inure to the estate or to 
the creditors). 
 103  But see Lubben, The Microeconomics of Chapter 11, supra note 3 (suggesting that 
the cost of bankruptcy transactions compared well to the cost of comparable non-
bankruptcy transactions). 
 104  See In re Ginji Corp., 117 B.R. 983, 988 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1990); see also In re 
Saturley, 131 B.R. 509, 516 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991) (suggesting that excessive fees result 
from “foreknowledge that the assets so expended will be surrendered in any event, by 
the debtor’s unwillingness to ‘strain his relationship with his life-rope, his attorney,’ 
and by the timidity of other counsel who, although adverse, may expect payment from 
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including agency issues—clients tend to spend someone else’s 
money105—and the client’s fear of alienating its professional advisors.106  
There are also time pressures inherent in many bankruptcy cases that 
are not present outside of bankruptcy.107  Another reason, not often 
discussed, is that even generally sophisticated clients may not be 
sophisticated consumers of professional corporate bankruptcy 
services.108  This may be a particular problem with debtors, who 
represent the single largest consumer of professional representation 
in chapter 11 cases.109  Although some companies file for bankruptcy 
under chapters 22 or 33, most companies will never spend time in 
bankruptcy, and those that do will usually make only one trip through 
the system.110  Without a substantial prospect of repeat business, 
professionals may lack a sufficient incentive for professionals to write 
off unproductive time.  Whatever the reason(s), bankruptcy clients 
appear unwilling to meaningfully contribute to the success of chapter 
11’s fee control system relative to their non-bankruptcy peers.111 
 
the estate, as well”) (citation omitted); Rapoport, Value Billing, supra note 21, at 131.   
 105  See Baker, supra note 17; see also LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES, supra 
note 41, at xv (suggesting that corporate bankruptcy cases tend to cost far more than 
expected). 
 106  Rapoport, Value Billing, supra note 21, at 131. 
 107  See Matthew A. Bruckner, Improving Bankruptcy Sales by Raising the Bar: Imposing 
a Preliminary Injunction Standard for Objections to Section 363 Sales, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 
(2012) (discussing the frequent assertion by debtors that bankruptcy sales must be 
hastily approved or their assets will melt away like an ice cube); Melissa B. Jacoby & 
Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 
123 YALE L.J. 862 (2014) (same); see also STEIN, supra note 45, at 45 (noting that many 
CEOs are in a hurry to hire bankruptcy professionals and have neither the time nor 
the capacity to determine whether potential hires are a good match).  
 108  See STEIN, supra note 45, at 44 (comparing the CEO of a troubled company to a 
newborn baby when it comes to bankruptcy matters).  
 109  See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 27 (finding that approximately 80% of 
professional fees are incurred “for representation of, or advice to, the debtor-in-
possession”); see also Rapoport, Value Billing, supra note 21, at 139–40. 
 110  Chapter 22 is the colloquial phrase sometimes used when a company files for 
chapter 11 bankruptcy for the second time.  See What is Chapter 22 Bankruptcy? Do Any 
Prominent Examples Come to Mind?, BERNSTEIN-BUCKLEY, P.C., http:// 
bernsteinlaw.com/faq-list/chapter-22-bankruptcy-creditors-rights-questions-and-
answers/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).  Similarly, Chapter 33 is the phrase for the far 
less common occurrence of a company taking a third trip into chapter 11 bankruptcy.  
See Scott Fearon, Dex Media: A Rare ‘Chapter 33’ Bankruptcy in the Making, SEEKING ALPHA 
(Sept. 26, 2013, 7:30 AM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/1714422-dex-media-a-
rare-chapter-33-bankruptcy-in-the-making.   
 111  Clients who feel ill-equipped to decide which professionals will do the best job 
for their company may feel compelled to hire the most expensive professional 
representatives that they can because they may view price as a proxy for competence.  
See, e.g., STEIN, supra note 45, at 48 (The author, a former CEO, complains in this book 
that the only bankruptcy counsel his company could afford was “a half-price lawyer.”).  
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Given the numerous potential problems with a client-centered fee 
control system in bankruptcy, Congress unsurprisingly imposed an 
external check on fees awarded to bankruptcy professionals in chapter 
11 cases.112  Congress’ external check required that Fee Controllers 
review both retention and fee applications.113  But its solution has not 
proved to be effective, and fee control obligations seem to overwhelm 
even the most diligent Fee Controllers.114  It could hardly be otherwise, 
considering that in a single mega-bankruptcy case Fee Controllers are 
expected to review a “massive” volume of fee applications, which “if 
stacked in one pile, would amount to a pillar of paper 27 feet high.”115  
But professionals will almost surely be overpaid if Fee Controllers 
decide not to put on their green eyeshades and audit every fee 
application because Fee Controllers are the last line of defense in 
chapter 11’s fee control process.116  Nevertheless, professional 
overcharging may remain inevitable under the system’s current design 
because it is not clear that Fee Controllers have the necessary resources 
to deter or prevent most professional overcharging even if they make 
a good faith effort.117  Therefore, it is appropriate to consider how to 
redesign the fee control system. 
 
 
 
 112  See LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES, supra note 41, at 132; see also Hirsch, 
supra note 14, at 1327 n.4 (stating that bankruptcy courts have “an affirmative duty to 
make an independent evaluation of reasonableness of all professional fees”) (citing In 
re Bilgutay, 108 B.R. 333, 336 n.2 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989)). 
 113  Judges are charged with second guessing the debtors-in-possession because 
debtors-in-possession are not “real fiduciaries.”  LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL 
FEES, supra note 41, at 132 (judges have been seen as necessary to prevent abuse 
because there “may be little incentive for parties in interest, and especially for the 
debtor, to monitor and object to excessive fee requests”); see also Baker, supra note 17, 
at 59 (“Because of the lack of stakeholder participation, the system has adopted 
administrative controls—independent review by bankruptcy courts or review by the 
U.S. Trustee—to fill the gap.”); Hirsch, supra note 14, at 1330 n.17 (“[T]he Code’s 
compensation scheme clearly envisions a large degree of court involvement in the 
employment and compensation of bankruptcy professionals . . .”).  
 114  But see Lubben, The Microeconomics of Chapter 11, supra note 3 (arguing that if 
“the direct costs of chapter 11 are in line with other large corporate transactions . . . 
general improvements in the market for professional services, rather than any 
bankruptcy-specific innovation” is the appropriate way to reduce chapter 11 costs). 
 115  In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 601 n.1 (3d Cir. 1984) (Becker, 
J., concurring).  
 116  Green Eyeshade, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Green_eyeshade (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2015). 
 117  Evidence suggests that they have not been terribly effective so far.  See LoPucki 
& Doherty, Determinants, supra note 50, at 114, 135 (finding that the average fee cut 
was less than 4% in forty-three of the forty-eight cases in authors’ database).  
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iii. Fee Controllers Cannot Effectively Control Professional 
Overcharging Without Additional Assistance 
Having Fee Controllers act as surrogates for the estate supposedly 
ensures that bankruptcy professionals do not overcharge their clients 
and deprive the estate of assets.  Although Fee Controllers are 
generally more willing than clients to control professional 
overcharging in chapter 11 cases, they too are generally ineffective.118  
Excluding potential deterrent effects, which LoPucki and Doherty’s 
work suggests are illusory (at least in the largest cases), chapter 11’s fee 
control system reduces fees by very little, and costs more to operate 
than it saves.119  Some bankruptcy scholars have proposed scrapping 
chapter 11’s entire fee control system and redesigning it from the 
bottom up.120  With appropriate crowdsourcing enhancements, 
however, that ought to be unnecessary. 
1. Effective Fee Reviews Require Three Things Fee Controllers 
Struggle With 
Evidence suggests that professional fees are too high, in part, 
because the statutorily mandated fee reviews in chapter 11 cases are 
ineffective.121  An effective fee review requires that Fee Controllers do 
at least three things well.  First, they must know every estate-paid 
professional.122  Second, Fee Controllers must be familiar with all of the 
work produced in a case and paid for by the estate.123  Finally, Fee 
 
 118  See supra notes 94–98. 
 119  See LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES, supra note 41, at 165 (claiming that 
our current fee control system costs approximately four times as much as it saves); see 
also WARNER & SHAPIRO, supra note 41, at 1 (“Few areas of bankruptcy practice are more 
publicly controversial or less consistently administered than the determination of 
reasonable compensation for the trustees and professionals who are essential to an 
efficient and well-managed bankruptcy process.”). 
 120  See, e.g., LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES, supra note 41, at 165.  But see 
Hon. Roger M. Whelan et al., Professional Compensation Reform: New Ideas or Old Failings?, 
1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 407, 407 (1993) (“[J]ust as one does not cut down the tree 
because a few apples have worms, the entire bankruptcy compensation scheme devised 
by Congress does not need to be scrapped to cure the excesses of what is only a 
minority of cavalier and greedy players in a few well-heralded cases.”).  
 121  See supra notes 94–98. 
 122  Although how well Fee Controllers must know the professionals in order to 
make the appropriate determinations is not clear, it seems that the bar is set fairly high 
by § 330.  It seems that Fee Controllers must know the professionals either through 
personal interactions or by otherwise acquiring sufficient information about these 
professionals to make the appropriate determinations. 
 123  As matters currently stand, it is not economical for Fee Controllers to review 
every piece of written work produced in a case.  In the interests of cost efficiency and 
the need for triage, some Fee Controllers are presumably left only reviewing the largest 
charges.  See Lupica & Rapoport, supra note 6 (noting the likely tendency of fee 
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Controllers must compare the work produced to the charges incurred 
for its production.  But, as described immediately below, Fee 
Controllers struggle with each task and would benefit from 
crowdsourcing some aspects of the process.  As a result, they do not 
perform effective fee reviews, and professional overcharging goes 
largely unchecked. 
a. Know the Professionals 
The first requirement for an effective fee review is to know the 
estate-paid professionals well enough to make the § 330 
determinations.124  Section 330 appears to require that Fee Controllers 
be intimately familiar with the professionals in the particular case at 
bar and with “comparably skilled practitioners.”  But there are often 
dozens (and there can be hundreds or even thousands) of estate-paid 
professionals involved in any given case.125  Thus, Fee Controllers may 
not possess sufficient familiarity with many bankruptcy professionals, 
particularly the newer ones, to make these determinations.126  This is 
true despite the presence of some repeat players.127  Fee Controllers 
need to obtain better information from outside sources, and could 
probably also use help reviewing the information received—
particularly in the largest cases. 
Section 330 requires that Fee Controllers know the estate-paid 
professionals well enough to make a series of informed decisions about 
their competence, skill, and experience, but it provides few tools for 
obtaining this information.  Existing information-acquisition methods 
appear limited to two options: (i) Fee Controllers’ first-hand 
knowledge of that professional and (ii) disclosure obligations imposed 
on the professionals.  Both of these methods seem insufficient for 
 
examiners to review only big ticket work items). 
 124  See supra text accompanying note 35. 
 125  See Brief for the Neutral Fee Examiners, supra note 56 (noting that 
approximately 5300 timekeepers sought compensation in the Lehman Brothers’ cases 
and 2200 timekeepers sought compensation in the American Airlines’ cases).  
 126  In many firms, mid-level professionals take the laboring oar on many tasks in a 
bankruptcy case.  See Lubben, The Microeconomics of Chapter 11, supra note 3, at 89–90.  
These mid-level professionals are unlikely to have encountered Fee Controllers often 
enough for Fee Controllers to have a personal impression of them.  Although Fee 
Controllers can request additional information about these professionals, it is unclear 
that is sufficient.  Cf. Third Cir. Task Force, supra note 17, at 262 (Judges may find that 
it is “difficult, indeed, in most instances, impossible, to police these matters by looking 
over the shoulders of lawyers to monitor the way they handle their cases.  To impose 
that obligation on the Bench is unrealistic, unduly time-consuming and typically will 
amount to little more than an exercise in hindsight.”).  
 127  See Lubben, Direct Costs, supra note 3, at 531 (contesting the claim that there are 
as many repeat players as is commonly thought).  
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obtaining the type of information necessary to prevent professional 
overcharging, particularly in large bankruptcy cases where thousands 
of professionals will seek compensation from the estate. 
Whether a bankruptcy case involves a dozen estate-paid 
professionals or thousands, the very structure of chapter 11 cases 
makes it difficult for Fee Controllers to personally know each 
professional well enough to make the requisite § 330 determinations.  
It is the nature of chapter 11 cases that negotiations often occur 
between different parties-in-interest concurrently and that some estate-
paid professionals are actively engaged while others are much more 
passive.  Fee Controllers do not know the estate-paid professionals 
personally because many firms send only a small cadre of professionals 
to court, which is where most Fee Controllers would interact with and 
get to know the relevant professionals.128  Instead, most firms’ 
professionals will labor totally in the background (at least to the eyes 
of Fee Controllers).  As a result, Fee Controllers lack sufficient 
personal familiarity with some (potentially large) portion of the estate-
paid professionals, making an effective fee review difficult if the 
professionals’ disclosures are not sufficient.129 
Fee Controllers are expected not only to know the bankruptcy 
professionals in the case at bar, but also to obtain information about 
“comparably skilled practitioners.”130  Given that Fee Controllers lack 
sufficient personal contact with the bankruptcy professionals who 
appear in bankruptcy matters, it is surely true that Fee Controllers will 
have even less information about comparably skilled non-bankruptcy 
professionals.  Obviously, some non-bankruptcy professionals appear 
in bankruptcy cases from time to time, but this does not seem to be a 
robust source of information about the market rates for non-
bankruptcy professional services.  In short, as bankruptcy professionals 
themselves, Fee Controllers’ first-hand knowledge of non-bankruptcy 
fees is necessarily limited. 
 
 128  Until professionals are sufficiently senior to appear in court, it is unclear where 
many Fee Controllers would become personally acquainted with those professionals.  
To the extent that firms continue to employ an “up or out” model, this suggests that 
most professionals working on a case will be virtually unknown to Fee Controllers.  See 
Up or Out, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Up_or_out (last visited Oct. 24, 
2015). 
 129  To the extent Fee Controllers believe they know professionals involved in a case, 
it is likely because that professional has appeared in a prior bankruptcy case.  Since 
Fee Controllers know the professionals who are repeat players, this means that they 
know the older and more experienced bankruptcy professionals.  Thus, they may know 
the more skilled professionals, which can skew their perceptions of the aggregate body 
of all professionals toward a more favorable perception. 
 130  11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3)(F) (2011). 
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Even though Fee Controllers lack sufficient first-hand 
information about both bankruptcy professionals and their 
comparably skilled non-bankruptcy brethren, Fee Controllers have an 
alternative method for obtaining this information.  Bankruptcy 
professionals are required to file fee applications that, among other 
things, must “contain sufficient information about the case and the 
applicant so that the court, the creditors, and the United States Trustee 
can review it without searching for relevant information in other 
documents.”131  In addition, the United States Trustees’ Office recently 
promulgated new Fee Guidelines covering professional disclosures in 
mega-bankruptcy cases.132  Among other things, bankruptcy 
professionals in mega-bankruptcy cases now have comparable 
compensation disclosure obligations.  Unfortunately, these Guidelines 
are both too new to have a sufficient track record to judge their 
efficacy, and apply in only a limited subset of bankruptcy cases.133  As a 
result, legitimate concerns remain about where Fee Controllers will 
obtain the necessary information to make the § 330 determinations 
they are required to make.134 
Although the mandatory disclosures are better than nothing, 
these disclosures also suffer from limitations.  First, the disclosures 
related to each professional’s skill and bankruptcy experience tend to 
be very limited.  For example, in Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP’s fee 
applications in the Lehman Brothers cases, the law firm135 disclosed 
only the year each associate was admitted to the bar and their practice 
group at the firm.136  Although professionals attest that, where possible, 
 
 131  28 C.F.R. § 58, app. A(a) (2010); see Rapoport, Value Billing, supra note 21, at 
126. 
 132  Fee Guidelines, supra note 19.  The new Fee Guidelines have some requirements 
that only apply to cases of a certain size. 
 133  See, e.g., Comment Letter from the N.Y.C. Bar Comm. on Bankr. & Corp. Reorg. 
to the Exec. Office for U.S. Trustees at 45 (Jan. 27, 2012), 
http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072236-CommentLetteronthe 
ProposedUSTrusteeGuidelinesforReviewingCompensationReimbursementGuideline
s.pdf (suggesting that the threshold for mega-bankruptcy cases should be increased so 
that even fewer cases are covered by the Fee Guidelines); cf. Fennell, supra note 11, at 
408. 
 134  The Guidelines do represent a clear step forward and the United States 
Trustees’ office should be commended for its effort.  
 135  This Article highlights Weil’s fee application because they are one of the most 
prominent and successful bankruptcy firms, not to suggest that they are—in any way—
acting less appropriately than other firms.  By contrast, in Author’s personal 
interactions, they have always acted appropriately.  See, e.g., MOVING FORWARD, supra 
note 18, at 935 (noting that when Weil served as debtors’ lead counsel, fees were not 
higher than when Skadden Arps served as lead counsel). 
 136  This is the standard practice.  All professional fee applications are available 
through the Electronic Case Filing system, but are also available at 
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they use skilled junior associates and paralegals, these limited 
disclosures are insufficient to allow Fee Controllers to determine the 
validity of these attestations.  Similarly, determining whether a 
professional spent a reasonable amount of time on a particular task 
requires much more specific information about that particular 
professional’s skill and experience.  Rough proxies, such as class year, 
are not sufficient to make these determinations accurately in most 
instances. 
Of course, if more substantial disclosures were made—
particularly in the largest bankruptcy cases—Fee Controllers would 
need assistance in making good use of that information.137  Under the 
current system, Fee Controllers appear overwhelmed by the quantity 
of information they must review in the largest cases.  Strengthening 
chapter 11’s fee control system, therefore, requires both better 
information and the ability to make efficient use of that information.  
As discussed below, crowdsourcing is well situated to strengthen 
chapter 11’s fee control system in precisely these two ways.138 
b. Know the Professionals’ Work 
The second requirement for an effective fee review is for Fee 
Controllers to be intimately familiar with all of the services provided 
and work product produced for the case and billed to the estate.  The 
Code requires Fee Controllers to evaluate whether the professional 
services rendered are “reasonably likely to benefit the estate” and 
“necessary to the administration of the case.”139  In making these 
determinations, Fee Controllers must also determine “whether the 
services were performed within a reasonable amount of time 
commensurate with the complexity, importance, and nature of the 
problem, issue, or task addressed.”140  If these criteria are not met, then 
Fee Controllers may not authorize the estate to pay the professionals.  
Here, Fee Controllers are likely to have sufficient information but may 
not have the ability to efficiently sort through that information to make 
the necessary determinations.  This is particularly true in the largest 
chapter 11 cases. 
Suggesting the inability of Fee Controllers to do this job efficiently 
is not meant to critique hard-working bankruptcy judges and Assistant 
United States Trustees.  Instead, this observation is meant to critique a 
 
http://dm.epiq11.com/LBH/Project#. 
 137  See infra Part III.A.ii. 
 138  See infra Part III.A.i. 
 139  11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4)(A) (2011). 
 140  § 330(a)(3)(D).  
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system that imposes exceedingly difficult obligations on Fee 
Controllers.  It is difficult to imagine how one or two people (e.g., a 
bankruptcy judge and an Assistant United States Trustee) can 
efficiently review all of the professional services provided in a large 
bankruptcy case.141  As a result, many Fee Controllers likely rely on their 
(considerable) experience with chapter 11 cases to determine—in a 
general way—what is appropriate in an average case, and then 
extrapolate from that experience to a particular case.  But § 330 
appears to require more particularized determinations of 
reasonableness. 
Fee Controllers must rely on disclosures made by estate-paid 
professionals in their fee applications to understand what services were 
provided in a particular case.142  Unlike the disclosures related to the 
skill and experience of the estate-paid professionals, these disclosures 
are very robust.  For example, in Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP’s tenth 
interim fee application in the Lehman Brothers cases, the firm 
provided approximately twenty pages describing, in narrative form, all 
of the work it provided to the estate and thereby sought to justify the 
almost forty-one million dollars in compensation it requested.143  In 
addition to the interim fee applications, firms often file a monthly fee 
application listing all of the work performed by each professional in 
increments of time as small as six minutes.144  If Fee Controllers were 
 
 141  Or even in a host of small cases and even with the help of the judges’ law clerks. 
 142  Fee Controllers are not personally familiar with all of the services provided to 
parties-in-interest and billed to the estate because most of the activity in large chapter 
11 cases happens outside of court, particularly for the non-legal professionals.  In the 
largest chapter 11 cases, estate-paid professionals will request hundreds of millions of 
dollars in compensation for work that takes place outside the watchful gaze of Fee 
Controllers.  But even in smaller cases, a large percentage of work will not occur in 
court.  Therefore, while the dollar figures will be smaller, it will remain difficult for 
Fee Controllers to be personally familiar with all of the work that the estate is being 
asked to pay for. 
  Because most professional compensation is earned for out-of-court work, it is 
inherently difficult for Fee Controllers to know if every person present at every 
meeting performed services “reasonably likely to benefit the estate” or “necessary to 
the administration of the case.”  § 330(a)(4)(A); see also In re Fleming Cos., 304 B.R. 
85, 91 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (requiring “all professionals attending a hearing to have 
a role.  [Therefore,] [i]f two or more professionals are billing time, they each should 
make a contribution.”) (quoting In re Jefsaba, 172 B.R. 786, 809–10 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1994)); Schratz, supra note 59, at 169 (collecting cases where courts cut fees across-the-
board even though all attorneys were prepared for and participated in hearings 
because those courts found that the professionals had duplicated efforts). 
 143  Once again, Weil is highlighted because it is one of the most prominent 
bankruptcy firms and not to reproach it. 
 144  See, e.g., Procedures for Monthly Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses, U.S. 
BANKR. CT. S.D.N.Y. (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/ 
files/2016-1-c-procedures.pdf. 
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able to closely review these enormously detailed fee disclosures, they 
could gain a more complete understanding of all the work performed 
in the case.  But, particularly in the largest cases, the volume of these 
disclosures must often be overwhelming.145  As a result, Fee Controllers 
may often lack the ability to review every time and expense entry and 
to confirm that each professional’s billing records align with those of 
other professionals. 
In order to make efficient use of the information being disclosed 
by the professionals, Fee Controllers need additional assistance to both 
identify work that was potentially unnecessary, duplicative, or wasteful, 
and to review that work product to aid in finally determining whether 
the work is compensable.  As explained below, crowdsourcing can 
provide this assistance.146 
c. Compare the Professionals’ Work to the Charges for 
That Work 
The third aspect of an effective fee review requires that Fee 
Controllers compare the work product produced or services rendered 
to the charges billed for those services.147  This is time-consuming work, 
because it may require a close reading of the work product and the 
astute mind of a professional reviewer to determine if the work product 
was appropriate to draft and, if appropriate, to determine if the work 
product was produced efficiently.148  In addition, bankruptcy judges 
can only approve the requested compensation if they have considered 
the time spent as compared to the “complexity, importance, and 
nature of the problem, issue, or task addressed.”149  Although many Fee 
Controllers are very experienced with reviewing fee applications and 
making these determinations, the sheer volume of fee applications in 
a large chapter 11 case makes this an onerous (if not impossible) 
task.150  And when coupled with the issues noted above—not knowing 
the professionals’ billing time to the estate and not having a chance to 
review much of the work product—fee review becomes exceedingly 
difficult to do well under the current system. 
 
 145  See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 601 n.1 (3d Cir. 1984) (Becker, 
J., concurring). 
 146  See infra Part III.  
 147  See Harold Lavien, Fees as Seen from the Bankruptcy Bench, 89 COM. L.J. 136, 136 
(1984).  
 148  Although innovative solutions, including the use of specialized computer 
software, could alleviate the burden on Fee Controllers to do this work, this work 
continues to—generally—be done by Fee Controllers and by hand. 
 149  See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3)(D) (2011); see also supra Part II.A. 
 150  See supra notes 94–98. 
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In sum, Fee Controllers must review the professional fees charged 
to the estate in every chapter 11 case to ensure that estate-paid 
professionals are not benefitting at creditors’ expense.151  Yet Fee 
Controllers are not properly equipped (and are sometimes 
unwilling)152 to adequately complete an effective fee review without 
additional assistance. 
2. This Difficult Task Engenders Seemingly Inaccurate 
Assumptions 
Given the “grinding” nature of an effective fee audit, Fee 
Controllers may understandably be disinclined to thoroughly review 
every fee application filed, even in small and medium-sized chapter 11 
cases.153  In fact, some courts have acknowledged that they examine 
only a subset of fee and expense entries, and then extrapolate from 
that sample.  For example, in In re Maruko, Inc., the bankruptcy court 
sampled a discrete number of time entries and then ordered a 30% 
across-the-board reduction because it determined that the professional 
had billed the estate for some unnecessary or unreasonable work in 
the sampled time entries.154  The court merely sampled the fee 
applications instead of doing a full review of every time and expense 
entry because a full review would have been too onerous.155  While this 
approach has much to offer (under the demands of the current fee 
control system), it appears at odds with congressional demands, 
particularly if courts are not well-versed in statistical sampling 
methods. 
Other courts appear disinclined to perform a fee audit, assuming 
that their oversight role is either unnecessary or a waste of time.  As a 
result, some courts assume that (i) bankruptcy professionals exercise 
 
 151  See, e.g., In re Busy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs., Inc., 19 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 152  Although some judges have very publicly acknowledged their disdain for fee 
control, this Article presumes that most Fee Controller wish to do the best job possible.  
Id. at 845 n.12 (“[I]t [does] not befit[] the stature of a federal bankruptcy judge to 
spend wasteful hours poring over fee applications . . . .”) (emphasis added); cf. 
Christine Simmons, Fee Auditors Rare in Bankruptcies: In Four Years of Examining, Only 
One Auditor Turns Up, MO. LAW. WKLY. (Mar. 14, 2011), 
www.legalcost.com/press/press_55.pdf (stating that “auditing a fee application is a 
grind”).  
 153  Simmons, supra note 152. 
 154  In re Maruko, Inc. 160 B.R. 633, 641 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1993). 
 155  Id.; see also In re Bank of New England Corp., 142 B.R. 584, 586 (D. Mass. 1992) 
(“[C]ourts should not spend [] nonexistent Court resources to track down every entry, 
correlate them against other fee applications, and . . . delete those entries insufficiently 
substantiated . . . .”) (all except the first alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
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billing judgment,156 (ii) the market for chapter 11 professional services 
will discipline overcharging professionals,157 and (iii) that “[i]t is almost 
impossible to ‘second guess’ the proper amount of time that counsel 
should have spent on a particular matter.”158  By making these 
assumptions, Fee Controllers may feel justified in declining to don 
their green eyeshades and dig through towering stacks of fee 
applications.  All three of these assumptions, however, appear 
incorrect, and none appear to justify a court’s failure to take seriously 
its fee review obligations. 
Not only do the aforementioned assumptions fail to justify 
abdicating judicial responsibility for fee control, but they also seem to 
be at odds with modern chapter 11 billing practices.159  The assumption 
regarding billing judgment has been thoroughly discussed above and 
those arguments will not be retread here.160  Instead, this Article begin 
with the second assumption—that professional compensation in 
chapter 11 is market-driven.  This assumption also appears to be 
erroneous.  Professional services providers in bankruptcy cases are not 
subject to the same market pressures as firms outside of bankruptcy.161  
Once the bankruptcy court approves a professional firm’s retention, 
there are incentives to charge the estate as much as possible.  As such, 
professional firms may treat their fee applications as the opening bid 
in a negotiation, a bid that Fee Controllers can disapprove.162  Without 
price pressure from clients, objections from other parties-in-interest, 
or a close examination by Fee Controllers, professional service 
providers are simply not constrained by a functioning market or 
anything approximating one.163  As a result, it should be no surprise 
 
 156  See In re Jefsaba, Inc., 172 B.R. 786, 798 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) (court expects 
that “unproductive time will be written off”); see also Schratz, supra note 59.  
 157  See, e.g., In re Jefsaba, Inc., 172 B.R. at 797 (citing In re Busy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs., 
Inc., 19 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994)); In re Patronek, 121 B.R. 728, 731 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1990).  
 158  In re Consol. Bancshares, Inc., 49 B.R. 467, 472 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985) 
(commenting on the difficulty in proving “that an issue was illusory, irrelevant or 
frivolous or that too many facts and transcript references had been marshaled”). 
 159  See generally Fortney, supra note 88. 
 160  See supra text accompanying note 78; see also Fortney, supra note 88. 
 161  See supra text accompanying notes 104–11. 
 162  Hirsch, supra note 14, at 1348 (describing why professionals may “hedge” their 
fee requests when they know they “may be subject to disallowance or discounting by 
the court upon review”); see also MOVING FORWARD, supra note 18, at 936 (reporting on 
“the apparent lack of impact which the appointment of a fee examiner has on 
professional fees in chapter 11 cases”). 
 163  See David Orozco, Democratizing the Law: Legal Crowdsourcing (‘Lawsourcing’) as a 
Means to Achieve Legal, Regulatory, and Policy Objectives, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. (forthcoming 
2016) (manuscript available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2520515) (stating that a 
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when chapter 11’s fee control system fails to rein in unreasonably high 
fees. 
Clients may also be complicit in this overcharging.  As noted 
above,164 courts review professional fees because clients do not.165  After 
all, most or all of that cost is likely to be borne by someone else.166  Thus, 
when the bankruptcy court in In re Patronek, suggested that “the proper 
measure of what fee is reasonable in any context is ascertainment of 
what an informed client and an informed attorney would agree should 
be paid for certain services,” it missed the mark.167  Using informed 
clients as a benchmark is difficult because informed clients may be 
willing to pay almost anything for the best possible representation and 
their professionals are likely willing to bill the estate for any services 
that might be remotely useful for their client, if they think the estate 
will reimburse them.168  With no party able to create effective price 
pressure on professional firms, the cost of professional representation 
in bankruptcy cases has unsurprisingly risen at five times the rate of 
inflation recently.169 
The third assumption Fee Controllers make is that second-
guessing a bankruptcy professional’s billing judgment is impossible.170  
But it may only be impossible because of the current design of chapter 
11’s fee control system.  In the absence of routine objections to 
professional fee applications,171 it is difficult for Fee Controllers to 
focus their attention on instances of potential abuse.172  Because the fee 
 
functional market is expected to put strong price pressure on law firms and should 
result in a reticence to pay for associates’ time if those associated are overused).  
Although Stephen Lubben argues that the bankruptcy market works no worse than 
the non-bankruptcy market, it is not clear whether this is an indictment of legal billing 
generally or contrary evidence suggesting that bankruptcy bills are like the 
temperature of baby bear’s soup in Goldilocks.  That is, they are “just right.”  TOM 
ROBERTS, GOLIDLOCKS AND THE THREE BEARS (1990); Lubben, The Microeconomics of 
Chapter 11, supra note 3. 
 164  See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 165  Even if clients do review fees, when they uncover apparent professional 
overcharging, the objective evidence suggests that they do not share this information 
with Fee Controllers.  Perhaps this is because the existing financial incentives are 
poorly aligned to encourage information-sharing.  By contrast, a crowdsourced fee 
control system would enable Fee Controllers to take advantage of the varying 
incentives that might drive creditors (or other information holders) to disclose to Fee 
Controllers when they identify potentially inappropriate professional fees or expenses. 
 166  See LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES, supra note 41, at 137.  
 167  121 B.R. 728, 731 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990).  
 168  See supra note 107. 
 169  See supra note 16. 
 170  See, e.g., In re Consol. Bancshares, Inc., 49 B.R. 467, 472 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985). 
 171  See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 172  See LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES, supra note 41, at 131 (claiming that 
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application and review process “provides the one real opportunity to 
control professional costs under the current system,” it is important to 
strengthen chapter 11’s fee control system.173 
The current fee control system often results in ineffective fee 
reviews.  As a result, courts seldom make substantial cuts to the fees 
requested,174 despite evidence (and the widespread belief) that a large 
number of bankruptcy professionals perform unnecessary work.175  In 
Part II, this Article introduces crowdsourcing and provides three 
examples of how companies have used crowdsourcing to solve similar 
problems as those faced by Fee Controllers.  In other words, 
crowdsourcing may offer solutions to chapter 11’s fee control problem, 
including the need for better information-gathering, information-
processing, coordination tools, and harnessing the wisdom of crowds 
to develop innovative solutions. 
II. WHAT IS CROWDSOURCING? 
Offering a simple definition for crowdsourcing is harder than one 
might expect because the word lacks a widely agreed-upon 
definition.176  Jeff Howe, who is widely credited with coining the term, 
defined crowdsourcing as a process by which employees and suppliers 
are replaced by an undefined, but generally large group of individuals 
identified via an open call on the Internet.177  By contrast, Wikipedia—
often described as an example of a successful crowdsourcing 
project178—defines crowdsourcing as “the process of obtaining needed 
 
only approximately 20% of all fee applications receive any objection, and that most of 
those objections are brought by the United States Trustee for violations of narrow, 
technical rules that involve only small dollar amounts); see also Whelan et al., supra note 
120, at 408 (claiming that chapter 11’s professional compensation scheme “is subject 
to abuses”). 
 173  Baker, supra note 17, at 57–58. 
 174  See Lavien, supra note 147, at 137; see also LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL 
FEES, supra note 41, at 257 (suggesting that corporate bankruptcy cases tend to cost far 
more than we would expect). 
 175  See Ross, supra note 20, at 3. 
 176  Enrique Estellés-Arolas & Fernando González-Ladrón-de-Guevara, Towards an 
Integrated Crowdsourcing Definition, 38 J. INFO. SCI. 189 (2012). 
 177  Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED (June 1, 2006, 12:00 PM), http:// 
archive.wired.com/wired/archive/14.06/crowds.html.  See also Orozco, supra note 
163. 
 178  A distinction is sometimes drawn between crowdsourcing, where the benefits of 
the crowd’s wisdom accrue to the person or entity positing the problem to be solved, 
and open source, where the benefits are returned to the crowd itself.  See, e.g., Daren 
C. Brabham, Crowdsourcing as a Model for Problem Solving: An Introduction and Cases, 14 
CONVERGENCE 75, 81–82 (2008) [hereinafter Brabham, Crowdsourcing as a Model].  This 
Article accepts this sensible distinction between open source and crowdsourcing, and 
thus would consider Wikipedia to be an open-source project and not a crowdsourced 
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services, ideas, or content by soliciting contributions from a large 
group of people, and especially from an online community, rather 
than from traditional employees or suppliers.”179  This Article will use 
a definition similar to Wikipedia’s, and defines crowdsourcing as any 
problem-solving method that generates solutions by drawing on the 
wisdom of crowds.180 
To help illustrate what crowdsourcing is and how it can work, the 
next section provides three examples of how crowdsourcing has been 
used to solve some problems relevant to fixing chapter 11’s fee control 
system.  The first two examples are examples of how companies have 
embraced crowdsourcing as a solution to information gaps and the 
need for contingent workers, among other problems.  The final 
example discusses a crowdsourcing platform that can be used by any 
company or individual with a problem to solve, particularly if they have 
a tedious but divisible problem. Among other things, these examples 
demonstrate that crowdsourcing: (i) is a useful tool for information 
gathering, including information about complex problems requiring 
specialized knowledge; (ii) can help divide large, tedious tasks into 
digestible chunks that can be solved by interested members of the 
crowd; (iii) allows the participation of non-experts, who often develop 
innovative solutions that bankruptcy professionals might never 
consider; and (iv) can be vastly cheaper than paying bankruptcy 
professionals for the same work.  These four benefits explain 
crowdsourcing’s intuitive appeal for enhancing (and not displacing) 
chapter 11’s fee control system. 
A. The Goldcorp Challenge 
In 2000, a troubled Canadian gold mining company, Goldcorp, 
Inc., turned to crowdsourcing to solve its problems.  Goldcorp was 
 
project because Wikipedia’s entries are “free content.”  Wikipedia: FAQ/Overview, 
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:FAQ/Overview#WHO 
(last visited Nov. 22, 2015).  As so defined, the solution offered in this Article may 
include aspects of both crowdsourcing and open sourcing, but this Article uses the 
crowdsourcing nomenclature nonetheless. 
 179  Crowdsourcing, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crowdsourcing (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2015) (quoting Crowdsourcing, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/crowdsourcing (retrieved Feb. 3, 
2014)).  
 180  “[U]nder the right circumstances, groups are remarkably intelligent, and are 
often smarter than the smartest people in them.”  See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM 
OF CROWDS xiii (2004); see also Brabham, Crowdsourcing the Public Participation Process, 
supra note 12, at 250; see generally Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal 
Theory, 2009 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2009) (suggesting that many minds are better than 
one because they more efficiently aggregate information, but only in some 
circumstances). 
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“[b]esieged by strikes, lingering debts, and an exceedingly high cost of 
production.”181  To make matters worse, the gold market was 
contracting.182  The company’s troubles were so severe that it had 
ceased its mining operations.183  Although Goldcorp’s CEO, Rob 
McEwen, believed the company owned valuable property, the 
company’s in-house geological team had not been able to reliably 
locate gold veins nor to estimate the amount of gold they would find 
in any particular vein.184  In response, McEwen took an unprecedented 
step for his industry and published his company’s confidential and 
proprietary geological data on the Internet.  In addition, the company 
offered more than half a million dollars in prize money to the team(s) 
that submitted the best estimates of where the company should mine 
and how much gold particular mines would contain.185  The results 
were nothing short of miraculous, and it seems fair to say that 
crowdsourcing solved the company’s financial woes. 
Crowdsourcing produced results for Goldcorp that were so 
stunning that they nearly caused the CEO to fall out of his chair when 
he saw them.186  News spread fast that the company had put “400 
megabytes worth of data about the 55,000 acre site . . . on the 
company’s website.”187  Within only a few weeks, submissions poured 
in.  Eventually, more than 1000 “virtual prospectors” from fifty 
countries reviewed the company’s data.188  In addition to an army of 
geologists, the company received submissions applying solutions from 
fields as diverse as “math, advanced physics, intelligent systems, 
 
 181  Don Tapscott & Anthony D. Williams, Innovation in the Age of Mass Collaboration, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 1, 2007), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2007-02-
01/innovation-in-the-age-of-mass-collaborationbusinessweek-business-news-stock-
market-and-financial-advice. 
 182  The contraction was so severe that the price of an ounce of gold fell below 
Goldcorp’s extraction costs.  The GoldCorp Challenge and the Beginning of Crowdsourced 
Analytics, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE VIA QUANTITATIVE METHODS (Feb. 22, 2012), 
http://cavqm.blogspot.com/2012/02/goldcorp-challenge-and-beginning-of.html 
[hereinafter COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE]. 
 183  With the price of gold falling below Goldcorp’s extraction costs, if they had 
continued to mine, they would have lost money with each ounce of gold they extracted 
from the ground.  See Tapscott & Williams, supra note 181. 
 184  Id. 
 185  Open Innovation: Goldcorp Challenge, IDEACONNECTION, 
http://www.ideaconnection.com/open-innovation-success/Open-Innovation-
Goldcorp-Challenge-00031.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2015) [hereinafter Open 
Innovation].  
 186  See Tapscott & Williams, supra note 181. 
 187  Id. 
 188  Id.; see Linda Tischler, He Struck Gold on the Net (Really), FAST COMPANY (May 31, 
2002, 5:00 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/44917/he-struck-gold-net-really 
(putting the number at more than 1400 participants).  
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computer graphics, and organic solutions.”189  Many of the virtual 
prospectors employed methods that had never before been used in the 
mining industry, and the results were impressive.190 
The prize-winning entry resulted from collaboration between two 
Australian groups, Fractal Graphics and Taylor Wall & Associates, and 
employed a novel technological solution.191  Together, these 
companies developed a 3-D map of the mining site that enabled 
Goldcorp to see the potential in one of its primary assets.192  The 
Australian prospectors identified more than 110 sites, half of which the 
company’s in-house team had not previously identified.  In addition, 
the Australian prospectors were accurate, uncovering “significant gold 
reserves” in more than 80% of their targets.193  Notably, these firms 
reportedly earned less in prize money than they normally charged for 
their services; perhaps acting in pursuit of publicity for their efforts.194 
Goldcorp’s crowdsourcing experiment yielded phenomenal 
results.  The company saved years of exploration time and increased 
its production by 851%.195  It also reduced its per-ounce extraction costs 
by approximately 84%, going from $360 per ounce to $59 per ounce.196  
In the end, it successfully mined over six billion dollars in gold as a 
result of the challenge.197  For an approximately half-million dollar 
investment, Goldcorp was catapulted from an “under-performing $100 
million company into a $9 billion juggernaut while transforming a 
backwards mining site in Northern Ontario into one of the most 
innovative and profitable properties in the industry.”198 
Several lessons can be drawn from this example.  First, 
crowdsourcing need not be limited to small, simple problems but can 
be used to develop solutions to complex challenges.  Second and 
related, crowds can bring specialized knowledge to bear.  Third, the 
crowd may offer interesting and unexpected perspectives on problems, 
such as a 3-D map, that may be surprisingly effective.  Fourth, 
crowdsourcing may be cheaper than the existing alternatives because 
 
 189  See Tapscott & Williams, supra note 181. 
 190  See id. 
 191  See id.; see also Tischler, supra note 188. 
 192  See Tischler, supra note 188. 
 193  Open Innovation, supra note 185.  
 194  See The Goldcorp Challenge—Who Has Replicated It Successfully?, QUORA, 
http://www.quora.com/The-Goldcorp-Challenge-who-has-replicated-it-successfully 
(last visited Nov. 22, 2015).  
 195  See COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 182. 
 196  See id.; see also Tischler, supra note 188.  
 197  Open Innovation, supra note 185. 
 198  See Tapscott & Williams, supra note 181. 
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members of the crowd may be incentivized by non-monetary rewards.199 
B. Proctor and Gamble Crowdsources Research and Development 
For more than a decade, Proctor and Gamble (“P&G”) has 
enthusiastically embraced crowdsourcing.200  P&G is a leading 
consumer goods company,201 a company whose brands are household 
staples such as Pantene shampoo, Crest toothpaste, Tide laundry 
detergent, and Pampers diapers.202  The company sells its products in 
almost every country in the world.203 In 2014, P&G sold more than 
eighty-four billion dollars in goods and delivered more than eleven 
billion dollars in profits.204  But, despite its global reach and robustly 
funded in-house research and development (“R&D”) team, P&G 
decided to share its “R&D, consumer understanding, marketing 
expertise, and brand equity” in order to bring “great innovations to 
market and into the lives of consumers faster.”205  As a result of the 
company’s “open innovation strategy,” it has established “more than 
2,000 successful agreements with innovation partners around the 
world.”206  In short, P&G has embraced crowdsourcing and 
crowdsourcing has produced valuable results. 
P&G turned to crowdsourcing only after its own internal 
innovation program had stopped being particularly innovative, 
causing its share price to fall.207  R&D had long been at the core of the 
company’s success, but its R&D department’s performance had 
slipped.208  New product launches were no longer as successful as they 
had been in the past.  Despite an already large R&D budget, P&G tried 
 
 199  The GoldCorp Challenge, supra note 194. 
 200  See Connect + Develop, P&G CONNECT + DEVELOP, 
http://www.pgconnectdevelop.com/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2015) [hereinafter Connect 
+ Develop] (“This site has been created to help external innovators and companies 
learn how to submit innovations to P&G’s Connect + Develop.  Connect + Develop is 
P&G’s program for encouraging open innovation, also known as crowdsourcing.”). 
 201  Proctor & Gamble, FORTUNE 500, http://fortune.com/fortune500/procter-
gamble-32/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2015) [hereinafter P&G Fortune 500].  
 202  See P&G Connect+Develop Launches New Open Innovation Website, P&G CONNECT + 
DEVELOP (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.pgconnectdevelop.com/home/stories/cd-
stories/20130207-pg-connectdevelop-launches-new-open-innovation-website.html.  
 203  Connect + Develop, supra note 200 (noting that P&G has “more than 300 brands 
in more than 180 countries”).  
 204  P&G Fortune 500, supra note 201.  
 205  Connect + Develop, supra note 200.  
 206  Id.  
 207  Tim Kastelle, Proctor & Gamble as an Open Innovation Case Study, 
CROWDSOURCING.ORG (June 7, 2012, 5:26 PM), http://www.crowdsourcing.org/ 
editorial/procter-gamble-as-an-open-innovation-case-study/15445.  
 208  Id. 
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to fix the problem by increasing that budget further.  After several 
years of trying to re-ignite its internal R&D team’s innovative fire with 
additional resources, P&G decided to try crowdsourcing.209 
By embracing crowdsourcing, P&G has been able to turn itself 
around.  It has entered into a wide array of deals with external 
innovators, including academic partnerships, joint ventures, 
trademark-licensing agreements, patent-licensing arrangements, and 
more.210  By leveraging crowd wisdom,211 the company has begun 
innovating again, has successfully launched many new products,212 and 
has better monetized its patent portfolio.213  Because the company 
embraced crowdsourcing, it has emerged as one of the world’s most 
innovative companies and reclaimed its status as a leading consumer 
products company.214 
As with the Goldcorp Challenge, access to a diverse pool of 
potential problem-solvers has been a key to P&G’s successful 
turnaround.  Notably, P&G does not crowdsource only through its own 
website, but has partnered with other companies that help 
crowdsource solutions, such as InnoCentive.215  InnoCentive also draws 
from a very diverse group of potential “solvers.”  Although some 
“solvers” have formal expertise in areas related to the problems they 
attempt to solve, others are merely hobbyists “working from their 
proverbial garage.”216  Perhaps counter-intuitively, a study of 
InnoCentive found that “the odds of a solver’s success increased in 
fields in which they had no formal expertise.”217  This example clearly 
demonstrates the value of non-expert problem-solvers. 
 
 209  Id. 
 210  See, e.g., Open Innovation Stories, P&G CONNECT + DEVELOP, 
http://www.pgconnectdevelop.com/home/stories/in-out-licensing/20130108-
bounce-fabric-softener.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).  
 211  “Critical components of more than 35 percent of the company’s initiatives were 
generated outside P&G.”  Howe, supra note 177. 
 212  Successful product launches occur more than one-half of the time now instead 
of only one-third of the time.  Kastelle, supra note 207. 
 213  Going from less than 10% of patents in use in products to more than 50%.  Id. 
 214  Katie Jacobs, How to Build an Innovative Company, HR (Jan. 21, 2013), 
http://www.hrmagazine.co.uk/hr/features/1075996/how-build-innovative-company.  
 215  InnoCentive is a platform for crowdsourcing solutions to complex problems.  
The “seekers” pay “solvers” anywhere from $10,000 to $100,000 per solution, and its 
solvers have cracked more than 30% of the problems posted on the site, “which is 30 
percent more than would have been solved using a traditional, in-house approach.”  
Howe, supra note 177. 
 216  Id. 
 217  Id. (citing Karim R. Lakhani et al., The Value of Openness in Scientific Problem 
Solving, (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 07-050, 2006), 
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/07-050.pdf). 
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Once again, there are some larger lessons to be learned from 
P&G’s example.  First, P&G’s in-house team was already very large 
(9000 people), but crowdsourcing gave the company access to a 
significantly larger (1.5 million) pool of contingent workers.218  
Second, these contingent problem-solvers came from a diverse 
background and devised more creative solutions to P&G’s problems 
than its in-house R&D team.  Third, P&G was able to leverage the ideas 
of others to re-establish itself as the preeminent consumer products 
company (i.e., much of crowdsourcing’s benefits inured to P&G’s 
benefit instead of the crowd).  Fourth, the crowd workers were able to 
handle complex jobs, and do so at a price that is a mere fraction of the 
value of their ideas.219 
C. Amazon Mechanical Turk and “Microtasking” 
Introduced in 2005,220 Amazon Mechanical Turk (“mTurk”) is a 
crowdsourcing platform intended to “give businesses and developers 
access to an on-demand, scalable workforce” and to allow workers to 
work on appealing projects at times that are convenient for them. 221  
MTurk coordinates “the use of human intelligence to perform tasks 
that computers are currently unable to do.”222  This crowdsourcing 
platform allows companies and individuals (“Requestors”) to post 
Human Intelligence Tasks (“HITs”) that they would like 
accomplished.  HITs are “typically simple enough to require only a few 
minutes to be completed” and payments for such tasks can be as low as 
one cent.223  While HITs can be more complicated, take longer, and 
 
 218  Id. (quoting Larry Huston, Procter & Gamble’s vice president of innovation and 
knowledge, as saying: “We have 9,000 people on our R&D staff and up to 1.5 million 
researchers working through our external networks.”).  
 219  The wages paid to crowdworkers is a contentious issue.  See, e.g., Karën Fort et 
al., Amazon Mechanical Turk: Gold Mine or Coal Mine?, 37 COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 
413 (2011), http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/COLI_a_00057.  
 220  Id. at 414.  
 221  Mechanical Turk Is a Market Place for Work, AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, 
https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).  
 222  In short, most HITs require the decision-maker to make judgment calls that 
computers are not currently well equipped to make.  Amazon Mechanical Turk, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amazon_ Mechanical_Turk (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2015).  Incidentally, this is also where the name comes from; the original 
Mechanical Turk was an “18th century chess playing ‘automaton’ that was in fact 
operated by a concealed person.”  Gabriele Paolacci et al., Running Experiments on 
Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 411, 411 (2010). 
 223  Some HITs are listed as paying nothing at all, though many of these seem to be 
test HITs.  See All HITs, AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com/ 
mturk/findhits?match=false! (last visited Nov. 22, 2015). 
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pay more, they still rarely pay more than one dollar.224  Sample tasks 
might include translating a single English language sentence into 
Urdu, annotating documents, tagging images or audio transcriptions, 
or completing a survey.225 
For Requestors, mTurk offers several challenges and benefits.  
The primary challenges are to divide complex tasks into basic steps, to 
fix an appropriate (and usually very low) reward, and to define 
successful completion.226  Quality control is also a potential 
challenge,227 but it is a seemingly surmountable one.228  Among other 
techniques, Requestors can require that workers (usually referred to as 
“Turkers”) pre-qualify before accepting any HITs, which seems to 
improve the quality of responses.229  Requestors are also free to accept 
or reject any work done by a Turker, although mTurk tracks this data 
and a high rejection rate makes it harder to attract Turkers to the 
Requestor’s future HITs.230  Finally, Turkers are classified as 
independent contractors and thus are not subject to certain labor law 
obligations that would arise if Turkers were classified as employees.231 
 
 224  For example, on January 23, 2015, mTurk listed 277,871 HITs available and only 
409 of those HITs paid more than one dollar.  HIT Search Results (Jan. 23, 2015) (on 
file with Author).  Some of those HITs, however, paid more than fifty dollars each.  Id.; 
see also Aniket Kittur et al., CrowdForge: Crowdsourcing Complex Work, PROC. 24TH ANN. 
ACM SYMP. ON USER INTERFACE SOFTWARE & TECH. 2011, at 43, 
http://ra.adm.cs.cmu.edu/anon/anon/hcii/CMU-HCII-11-100.pdf (reporting that 
the modal HIT in this study paid three cents). 
 225  Fort et al., supra note 219 (Urdu and annotation examples); Paolacci et al., supra 
note 222, at 412 (tagging and survey examples); see also Episode 600: The People Inside 
Your Machine, PLANET MONEY (Mar. 31, 2015, 11:13 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2015/01/30/382657657/episode-600-the-
people-inside-your-machine.  
 226  Fort et al., supra note 219, at 414. 
 227  Id. at 415. 
 228  Requestors have used a variety of techniques to ensure quality results, including: 
(i) providing above-average payments; (ii) incorporating some sort of reputation score 
for Turkers; (iii) building the Requestor’s reputation with Turkers; (iv) identifying 
intrinsically motivated people; and (v) having the Requestor directly verify a sample of 
the results.  Catherine E. Schmitt-Sands & Richard J. Smith, Prospects for Online 
Crowdsourcing of Social Science Research Tasks: A Case Study Using Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (Jan. 9, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2377016; see also Julie S. Downs et al., Are Your Participants 
Gaming the System? Screening Mechanical Turk Workers, PROC. SIGCHI CONF. ON HUM. 
FACTORS COMPUTING SYS., 2010, at 2399, http://lorrie.cranor.org/pubs/note1552-
downs.pdf (discussing screening workers in advance as a quality-control technique). 
 229  Amazon Mechanical Turk, supra note 222.  See also Schmitt-Sands & Smith, supra 
note 228. 
 230  Amazon Mechanical Turk, supra note 222.  See also Schmitt-Sands & Smith, supra 
note 228 (finding that the Requestor’s reputation was an important determinant in 
worker quality). 
 231  See Fort et al., supra note 219, at 414 (labeling mTurk as “an unregulated labor 
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Despite some concerns about the service facilitating a “digital 
sweatshop,” mTurk has been successful in a variety of applications.232  
These successful applications include: (i) conducting experimental 
research;233 (ii) writing articles;234 (iii) identifying duplicate entries and 
verifying the details of item entries;235 and (iv) collecting information.236  
These latter two applications are particularly relevant to fee control.  
Chapter 11’s fee control system is less effective than it could be because 
Fee Controllers lack the best information available regarding, among 
other things, instances of potential overcharging.  Also, the system’s 
enforcers need assistance reviewing the information that they do 
receive, and would benefit from outsourcing some aspects of the fee 
control process to workers who could quickly, inexpensively, and 
accurately review fee applications. 
These examples were intended to help explain what 
crowdsourcing is and what it can do.  They have also hinted at 
crowdsourcing’s potential in the bankruptcy realm.  With that, this 
Article will now provide a deeper look into how crowdsourcing can 
improve chapter 11’s fee control system in several specific ways.  The 
following part of this Article will also discuss some core issues that 
would need to be addressed before fully implementing a crowdsourced 
fee control system. 
III. CROWDSOURCING FEE CONTROL 
Our current fee control system is ineffective because it burdens 
Fee Controllers with the task of deterring and preventing 
unreasonable or unnecessary professional fees without providing them 
with adequate tools to make that burden bearable.237  Fee Controllers 
could do a better job of fee control if they had additional assistance in 
at least three areas: (i) information-gathering; (ii) information-
 
marketplace: a system which deliberately does not pay fair wages, does not pay due 
taxes, and provides no protections for workers”).  
 232  See, e.g., Ellen Cushing, Amazon Mechanical Turk: The Digital Sweatshop, UTNE 
(Jan./Feb. 2013), http://www.utne.com/science-and-technology/ 
amazonmechanical-turk-zm0z13jfzlin.aspx#ixzz3PgZ2MnIC. 
 233  See Paolacci et al., supra note 222, at 413. 
 234  See Kittur et al., supra note 224 (finding that article writing went “surprisingly 
well”).  
 235  Amazon Mechanical Turk, supra note 222 (describing how mTurk can be used to 
find duplicative listing in yellow pages directories, identify duplicate entries in online 
product catalogs, and verify details of restaurants, such as hours of operation).   
 236  Id. (describing how mTurk can be used to collect information, such as by 
searching “data elements or specific fields in large government and legal documents”).  
 237  See supra notes 94–98.  But see Hirsch, supra note 14. 
BRUCKNER (DO NOT DELETE) 1/28/2016  12:24 PM 
2016] CROWDSOURCING (BANKRUPTCY) FEE CONTROL 403 
processing; and (iii) innovation.  First, Fee Controllers need better 
information about bankruptcy professionals and their work product to 
improve their § 330 determinations.  They would also benefit if others 
would help highlight specific instances of potential professional 
overcharging.  Second, Fee Controllers need additional resources to 
make efficient use of this information.  Without the ability to efficiently 
process the information they receive, additional information (even if 
it is better information) will not improve chapter 11’s fee control 
system.  Finally, chapter 11’s fee control system would benefit from 
innovation.  Without changes in these three areas, chapter 11’s fee 
control system is likely to remain unable to control certain types of 
professional overcharging.238 
As suggested by the three examples from the previous section of 
this Article, crowdsourcing can help fix chapter 11’s broken fee 
control system by offering solutions in each of its three problem areas.  
It also bears repeating that crowdsourcing can simply be an additional 
tool to improve chapter 11’s fee control system.  For example, in P&G’s 
case, the company already had a well-established R&D department, but 
it turned to crowdsourcing because it allowed the company to do 
better than it could do otherwise.  Similarly, there is a role for 
crowdsourcing in chapter 11’s fee control system to support 
bankruptcy judges, Assistant United States Trustees and fee examiners, 
who already perform many fee control tasks.  Crowdsourcing need not 
displace Fee Controllers, but could serve to supplement their efforts to 
control the cost of corporate bankruptcy cases. 
In essence, determining the appropriate fees in a bankruptcy case 
is predicated on solving the following problem: how to solicit the 
optimal amount of professional services without overpaying for those 
services.  This problem—like any problem that can be clearly framed 
and where the relevant data can be made available to interested 
problem-solvers—can be crowdsourced.239  The complexity of the 
problem240 and the need for some specialized knowledge241 are not 
 
 238  See LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES, supra note 41, at 180 (noting that 
too few objections are made for “billing too many hours for the task” because our fee 
control “system has no defense against that kind of overcharge”). 
 239  See Brabham, Crowdsourcing the Public Participation Process, supra note 12, at 252. 
 240  William D. Eggers & Rob Hamill, Five Ways Crowdsourcing Can Transform the 
Public Sphere, GOVERNING (May 23, 2012), http://www.governing.com/columns/ 
mgmt-insights/col-government-crowdsourcing-five-models.html (discussing how to 
crowdsource complex problems that require creative solutions, such as how the city of 
Santa Cruz, California effectively crowdsourced solutions to its budget deficit); see also 
Brabham, Crowdsourcing the Public Participation Process, supra note 12, at 252. 
 241  Stephen M. Wolfson & Matthew Lease, Look Before You Leap: Legal Pitfalls of 
Crowdsourcing, 48 PROC. AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. AND TECH. 1, 2 (2011) (discussing 
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barriers to crowdsourcing a solution, as the Goldcorp and P&G 
examples help illustrate.  If history is any guide, crowdsourcing fee 
control ought to result in greater fee reductions because more eyes will 
be on professional fee applications. 
A. How Crowdsourcing Can Help Fix Chapter 11’s Fee Control System 
i. Information Gathering 
In a crowdsourced fee control system, additional information 
ought to become available to Fee Controllers.242  Currently, 
information comes from two primary sources: (i) disclosures by the 
professionals seeking to have their initial retention applications or 
subsequent fee applications approved; and (ii) objections to retention 
and fee applications.  Given the evidence of professional overcharging 
provided above and how infrequent and modest reductions are, it 
seems evident that these sources of information are inadequate.  In 
other words, this Article assumes that the reason why fee applications 
are not cut more regularly and more deeply is Fee Controllers’ inability 
to identify many instances of professional overcharging.  The evidence 
suggests that Fee Controllers could deter or prevent a larger share of 
professional overcharging if they had better information.243 
This additional information could come from a variety of sources, 
including (i) parties-in-interest to the current case, including 
bankruptcy professionals;244 (ii) other bankruptcy professionals (i.e., 
 
crowdsourcing problems that require “specialized skills and a significant time 
commitment from the workers”). 
 242  Eggers & Hamill, supra note 240; see also Michael J. Franklin et al., CrowdDB: 
Answering Queries with Crowdsourcing, PROC. 2011 ACM SIGMOD INT’L CONF. ON MGMT. 
DATA, 2011, at 61 (noting that dividing a larger task into “microtasks” allows the 
participation of people who have no special training and does not require a lot of their 
time); Stephen K. Ichatha, The Role of Empowerment in Crowdsourced Customer 
Service (May 11, 2013) (unpublished Exec. D.B.A. dissertation, Georgia State 
University), http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context 
=bus_admin_diss. 
 243  See LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES, supra note 41, at 189 (fee 
applications that are subject to objection tend to be cut more often and more deeply 
than those that are not). 
 244  Attorneys may not be able to receive a monetary reward for assisting Fee 
Controllers if they must disclose confidential information about their client in order 
to do so.  See Jennifer M. Pacella, Advocate or Adversary? When Attorneys Act as 
Whistleblowers, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1027, 1046 (2015) (noting that, among others, 
the New York County Lawyers’ Association (“NYCLA”) has determined that New York 
lawyers may not ethically participate in certain whistleblower bounty programs if they 
must reveal confidential client information to receive the bounty).  In addition, given 
fears of potential retaliation, perhaps it would create a conflict of interest for an 
attorney to ever seek a bounty at the same time he or she was representing a client in 
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those not involved in the current case);245 (iii) non-bankruptcy 
professionals; (iv) persons (professional or otherwise) that have, in 
previous cases, interacted with the professionals seeking compensation 
in the current case;246 and (v) members of the general public with no 
prior involvement in the case or with the professionals.247  Under the 
current fee control system, only the first category of people—parties-
in-interest to the current case—is invited to participate in the fee 
control process.  Yet, by and large, these persons do not participate.  In 
addition, the remaining four categories of people are not entitled to 
participate, even if they have information that could help identify 
instances of professional overcharging or assist Fee Controllers with 
making certain § 330 determinations. 
Greater participation in the fee control process, whether via 
formal objection or otherwise, is likely to help reduce professional 
overcharging.248  With appropriate incentives,249 parties might share a 
host of information relevant to the fee control process.  For example, 
crowdsourcing can help reduce professional overcharging by 
incorporating feedback from colleagues and past clients about a 
particular professional’s prior billing practices.250  Colleagues and 
clients can inform Fee Controllers that this professional has, on 
previous occasions, had his or her fees reduced because the judge 
found that they had overbilled their clients.251  While clearly not 
 
the current matter.  Id. at 1048. 
 245  Apparently the American Bar Association has expressed a general concern that 
“whistleblower awards for attorneys threaten the client right to effective counsel” by 
inhibiting the “free flow of information between client attorney and the quality of the 
attorney’s representation to the client.”  Id. at 104950 (citing Letter from Stephen N. 
Zack, President of Am. Bar Ass’n to Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (May 20, 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-315.pdf).   
 246   The NYCLA has also noted ethical concerns if a lawyer used confidential 
information gleaned during a prior representation to his or her client’s detriment in 
the future.  Id. 
 247  Although somewhat counterintuitive, research suggests that even non-experts 
can be a very valuable source of information, often solving problems that stump the 
experts.  Brabham, Crowdsourcing the Public Participation Process, supra note 12, at 244.  
In addition, a lot of work that happens in a bankruptcy case is not “bankruptcy” work 
at all.  See Lubben, The Microeconomics of Chapter 11, supra note 3, at 23 (highlighting 
that non-bankruptcy attorneys are significant contributors to chapter 11 cases). 
 248  See LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES, supra note 41, at 189. 
 249  How to appropriately incentivize parties to participate in the fee control process 
is addressed infra Part III.B.ii. 
 250  Cf. T. Michael Mather, Twelve Most Common Mistakes by Beginning Attorneys, 26 
TEMPLE J. SCI., TECH. & ENVTL. L. 43, 49 (2007) (noting that attorneys’ reputations are 
regularly discussed informally by their fellow attorneys). 
 251  It is not very common for professionals to be called out for their over-billing, 
but it does happen.  See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, The Problem of Inflating Billable Hours, 
BRUCKNER (DO NOT DELETE) 1/28/2016  12:24 PM 
406 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:361 
dispositive, a robust record of prior fee reductions may encourage Fee 
Controllers to take a closer look at that professional’s fee requests in 
the current case.252  Furthermore, the additional scrutiny may deter 
future overbilling by putting professionals on notice that their actions 
in prior cases may be relevant in the current case. 
Non-bankruptcy professionals could play an important role in 
providing Fee Controllers information about whether the 
compensation requested by estate-paid professionals “is reasonable 
based on the customary compensation charged by comparably skilled 
practitioners” in non-bankruptcy cases.253  This information relating to 
customary non-bankruptcy compensation is clearly conducive to 
crowdsourcing.254  Consumers of bankruptcy services (i.e., clients) 
might be willing to reveal the discounts they received on their bills or 
the hourly rates they were charged, which would help Fee Controllers 
distinguish between the headline rates advertised and the fees actually 
charged to clients.  In addition, non-bankruptcy professionals might 
be willing to disclose similar information.  In other contexts, 
consumers regularly volunteer enormous amounts of information 
about their experiences for no apparent personal gain.255  For example, 
millions of people voluntarily complete product reviews on 
Amazon.com for reasons that are not clear.256  Perhaps consumers of 
 
VERDICT (Nov. 17, 2014), http://verdict.justia.com/2014/11/17/problem-inflating-
billable-hours (describing several cases). 
 252  Cf. Rosen & Bazian, supra note 21, at 44–45 (noting that a party’s prior practices 
are highly relevant to certain determinations in the current case) (citing In re 
Complaint of Judicial Misconduct (In re Complaint), 761 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2014)).  In 
In re Complaint, the Ninth Circuit held that a firm’s prior refusal to adhere to certain 
court-mandated billing practices was a sufficient basis for denying that firm’s retention 
in future cases.  The firm’s alleged improprieties came to light because the bankruptcy 
judge whose orders were ignored was called upon to approve the firm’s retention in a 
new case.  Having established that a firm’s shoddy work in previous cases is sufficient 
to deny retention in a new case, it is not clear why bankruptcy courts should be the 
only parties empowered to bring this information to light, or, if a firm is retained, why 
previous impropriety—particularly financial impropriety—should not also be grounds 
to take a closer look at a firm’s fee applications in a new case.  See Rosen & Bazian, 
supra note 21, at 45 (noting that estate-paid professionals may need a reminder “that 
their conduct and the quality of their work might have repercussions well beyond those 
for the case in which they are currently employed”).  
 253  11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3)(F) (2011). 
 254  Cf. Eggers & Hamill, supra note 240 (discussing how crowdsourcing allows 
decision-makers to harness “on-the-ground knowledge from the people who know a 
problem intimately”). 
 255  Fennell, supra note 11, at 392–93. 
 256  “No doubt developing a reputation for being a top reviewer is a motivation for 
some people.”  But other reasons are “not at all obvious.”  Steven D. Levitt, Why Do 
People Post Reviews on Amazon?, FREAKONOMICS (July 22, 2005, 10:05 PM), 
http://freakonomics.com/2005/07/22/why-do-people-post-reviews-on-amazon/. 
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bankruptcy and comparable professional services could be induced to 
act similarly.  A crowdsourced fee control system could create “a set of 
conditions that both enable and motivate people who possess the 
relevant information to reveal it” in order to generate useful 
information for Fee Controllers.257 
Perhaps most obviously, bankruptcy professionals are likely to 
have valuable information that would benefit Fee Controllers.  For 
example, some bankruptcy professionals involved in the current 
matter are likely to have an informed view about whether other estate-
paid professionals are requesting excessive compensation, given the 
tasks they allegedly completed, either because the tasks took far longer 
than appropriate or because the task was unnecessary to perform.  
These professionals are likely to develop informed views on these 
matters in the course of their work for their own clients.  This is 
because many estate-paid professionals routinely review the work 
produced by other estate-paid professionals in their role as 
professional representatives of the estate’s creditors and interest 
holders.  If, for example, the official committee for the unsecured 
creditors files a motion for summary judgment, a variety of estate-paid 
professionals, including debtor’s counsel, will review that motion.  Now 
imagine that those other estate-paid professionals believe that the 
motion was improvidently filed due to obviously contested material 
facts.258  If those professionals shared that view with the Fee Controllers, 
the Fee Controllers might more closely review the relevant fee 
application to ensure that the estate does not pay for preparing and 
prosecuting a potentially unnecessary or unreasonable summary 
judgment motion.  In this way, crowdsourcing can piggy-back on the 
work already being done by estate-paid professionals to efficiently 
evaluate the fee applications of other professionals involved in a 
particular bankruptcy case.259 
ii. Information Processing 
In some cases, Fee Controllers are unable to deter or prevent 
professional overcharging because they lack sufficient information, 
but in other cases, the problem seems to be that Fee Controllers are 
 
 257  Fennell, supra note 11, at 393. 
 258  Cf. Brief for the Neutral Fee Examiners, supra note 56.  
 259  This piggy-backing quality also helps explain why a crowdsourced fee control 
system may be less expensive than the current system, which relies on wholly 
disinterested parties such as fee examiners who must review all of the work produced 
as part of their fee control duties. 
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presented with too much information.260  In such cases, Fee Controllers 
may inadvertently ignore useful information because they cannot sort 
the useful information from the useless information.  Crowdsourcing 
should be able to assist Fee Controllers with processing the 
information they receive in order to identify instances of professional 
overcharging.  One advantage of crowdsourcing, as suggested by the 
examples above, is that crowdsourcing provides access to a large pool 
of contingent workers who can be gainfully employed in reviewing the 
information that seems to overwhelm Fee Controllers. 
Fee application review would seem to be a nearly ideal project for 
a crowdsourced solution. The new Fee Guidelines already require 
estate-paid professionals in mega-bankruptcy cases to keep 
contemporaneous time entries “in time periods of tenths of an hour,” 
that services “be noted in detail and not combined or ‘lumped’ 
together, with each service showing a separate time entry,” and that 
time entries “give sufficient detail” to identify the nature of the service 
provided.261  In short, professional fee applications are already divided 
into the type of discrete chunks of information that separate 
individuals could review asynchronously and on which those 
individuals can provide feedback.  And because no special expertise is 
required, the pool of people who could potentially serve as adjunct fee 
controllers is enormous.262 
A crowdsourced fee control system should devolve the initial 
review of professional fee applications to the crowd.  The crowd could 
initially review the time and expense entries in fee applications to look 
for patterns, double-check the fees and expenses against any relevant 
local rules or guidelines, and cross-check time entries across billers and 
across professionals.  The value of crowdsourcing is particularly 
evident when considering the type of cross-referencing that must be 
part of a detailed fee review.  One point of cross-referencing 
professional fee applications is to verify the accuracy of the requested 
compensation.  For example, when multiple professionals attend the 
same meeting, cross-referencing their fee applications helps to ensure 
that no professional is requesting compensation for more time than 
others at the same meeting.  The crowd should be able to identify every 
professional billing time for attending the same meeting and then flag 
for Fee Controllers if one or more professionals billedperhaps 
 
 260  Cf. In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 601 n.1 (3d Cir. 1984) (Becker, 
J., concurring).   
 261  Fee Guidelines, supra note 19; see, e.g., Rapoport, Value Billing, supra note 21, at 
126 (quoting the U.S. Trustee Guidelines, 28 C.F.R. § 58, app. A(a) (2010)).  
 262  Eggers & Hamill, supra note 240; see also Franklin et al., supra note 242. 
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inadvertentlymore time than the rest of the professionals at that 
meeting.  In that case, Fee Controllers (rather than the crowd) can 
follow up with the relevant professional.263  Where, like this example, a 
task can be clearly defined and the crowd can be appropriately 
incentivized, much of the tedious work of reviewing fee applications 
could be effectively crowdsourced.  Moreover, these adjunct fee 
controllers might be able to bring innovative solutions to bear from 
other fields to, among other things, mine this data more effectively 
then currently occurs. 
A crowdsourced fee control system can be expected to produce 
even more information than the current system does.  A critical feature 
of any crowdsourced fee control system must include a method of 
sorting the useful information from the useless information.264  A 
variety of solutions to this sorting problem appear to be available.  
Borrowing from a method already used by fee examiners, one solution 
is to focus first on big-ticket items.265  Information produced by the 
crowd could be input, by the crowd, into a sortable database.  This 
could allow Fee Controllers to focus on information related to the 
most egregious instances of potential professional overcharging first. 
Another solution is to utilize the crowd to “bubble up” 
information.266  Once members of the crowd have identified instances 
of potential overbilling by professionals, those instances could be 
resubmitted to the crowd, which can itself provide a quality-control 
function by confirming that the highlighted entries do, in fact, 
 
 263  If the crowd finds potential issues, it could bring these issues to the attention of 
Fee Controllers, much as Congress assumed that creditors would do in corporate 
bankruptcy cases.  See supra note 8. 
 264  Crowdsourcing may be even more useful in vetting information produced by 
others than producing the original information itself.  See also Michael S. Bernstein et 
al., Soylent: A Word Processor with a Crowd Inside, PROC. 23RD ANN. ACM SYMP. ON USER 
INTERFACE SOFTWARE & TECH, 2010, at 313, http://courses.cse.tamu.edu/caverlee/ 
csce438/readings/soylent.pdf.  
 265  See Lupica & Rapoport, supra note 6 (noting the tendency of fee examiners to 
review only big-ticket work items). 
 266  At least one study has found that requiring at least five members of the crowd 
to identify the same issue can help to achieve expert-quality results.  See Chris Callison-
Burch, Fast, Cheap, and Creative: Evaluating Translation Quality Using Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk, PROC. 2009 CONF. ON EMPIRICAL METHODS IN NAT. LANGUAGE 
PROCESSING, 2009, at 286, 293, https://www.aclweb.org/anthology/D/D09/D09-
1030.pdf.  In essence, crowdsourcing allows brute force solutions to problems.  See 
Jeffrey M. Rzeszotarski & Aniket Kittur, Instrumenting the Crowd: Using Implicit Behavioral 
Measures to Predict Task Performance, PROC. 24TH ANN. ACM SYMP. ON USER INTERFACE 
SOFTWARE & TECH, 2011, at 13, http://jeffrz.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/ 
fp359-rzeszotarski.pdf (discussing the value of multiple redundant worker judgments 
as a quality-control mechanism). 
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concern instances of overcharging.267  By employing a two-step 
crowdsourced process (information-production and information-
verification), some studies have found that, under certain conditions, 
a crowd of novices can produce near-expert results.268 
Still another solution would be to task fee examiners or the 
United States Trustees’ office with evaluating the responses of the 
crowd instead of doing the initial work of identifying instances of 
potential overbilling.269  Given the rates charged by fee examiners, 
redeploying them in an information-verification role instead of an 
information-production role could produce substantial cost savings 
without any decrease in the quality of fee control.  Finally, the 
bankruptcy court would remain the ultimate arbiter of whether a 
particular fee or expense was appropriate or not.  Crowdsourcing can 
merely help highlight the most potentially problematic bills so that the 
court can review them. 
iii. Innovation 
Crowdsourcing also promises to help fix chapter 11’s flawed fee 
control system by unleashing innovation.  In other contexts, 
crowdsourcing has resulted in creative solutions to problems that 
previously stumped experts in those fields.  For example, Netflix 
created a prize to improve the company’s algorithm for movie 
recommendations after the company’s own engineers likely ran out of 
ideas.270  Similarly, crowdsourcing generated innovative solutions for 
locating rich veins of gold for Goldcorp to mine after the company’s 
in-house geological team proved unsuccessful.271  Crowdsourcing also 
allowed P&G to recapture its place as a top consumer products 
company by allowing the company to find innovative partners who 
 
 267  See Aniket Kittur et al., Crowdsourcing User Studies with Mechanical Turk, PROC. 
SIGCHI CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS COMPUTING SYS., 2008, at 453, 455, http://www-
users.cs.umn.edu/~echi/papers/2008-CHI2008/2008-02-mech-turk-online-
experiments-chi1049-kittur.pdf (finding that when there are “explicitly verifiable 
questions as part of the task,” the crowd is able to provide work that is near expert 
quality, despite the crowd representing “a more novice perspective”). 
 268  See id.; see also Bernstein et al., supra note 264, at 314 (employing a Find-Fix-
Verify system to split tasks “into a series of generation and review stages that utilize 
independent agreement and voting to produce reliable results”). 
 269  Goldcorp appears to have utilized a panel of expert judges to evaluate 
submissions in the Goldcorp Challenge.  Press Release, Goldcorp., Inc., Exploration 
at Web Speed Semi-Finalists Earn 1st US$250,000 in the World’s First INTERNET 
GOLDRUSH (Oct. 26, 2000), http://www.infomine.com/index/pr/Pa055952.PDF.  
Fee control could follow suit.  
 270  NETFLIX PRIZE, http://www.netflixprize.com/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2015). 
 271  See supra Part II.A. 
BRUCKNER (DO NOT DELETE) 1/28/2016  12:24 PM 
2016] CROWDSOURCING (BANKRUPTCY) FEE CONTROL 411 
reignited the firm’s R&D department.272 
Chapter 11’s fee control system could benefit from crowdsourced 
innovations.  Some of those innovations might be the development of 
entirely new ideas on how to control fees, but other innovations might 
relate to how to perform existing fee control tasks more efficiently.  
Crowdsourcing might also serve as a mechanism to implement some 
of these new ideas. 
Commentators have already put forward a host of ideas on how to 
improve the fee control process.  These ideas include, among others, 
creating a series of benchmarks for the cost of common professional 
services in chapter 11 cases.273  Professional fees in bankruptcy cases are 
a matter of public record and members of the crowd could review the 
data in prior bankruptcy cases to create these benchmarks.274  For 
example, this type of work might reveal that in the last ten mega-
bankruptcy cases, professionals were paid a median fee of $10,000 to 
prepare a joint administration motion.275  If in a new case a professional 
firm requests $20,000 to prepare a joint administration motion, Fee 
Controllers might justifiably require that firm to explain why an 
upward departure from comparable recent cases is warranted.276  
Similarly, it might be appropriate to safe-harbor compensation 
requests that fall below that historic norm. 
Another innovative solution that the crowd might help 
implement would be to create a database of bankruptcy professionals 
and their experience so that Fee Controllers could more easily make 
the required determinations under § 330(a)(3)(E).277  With such 
information, professionals lacking substantial bankruptcy experience 
might be unable to bill their time at rates comparable to more 
seasoned bankruptcy professionals.  As matters currently stand, most 
law firms disclose only the class year of associates, which is, at best, a 
 
 272  See supra Part II.B. 
 273  See LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES, supra note 41. 
 274  Another benefit of these benchmarks might be to convince some bankruptcy 
professionals to more confidently switch from an hourly fee model to a value-billing 
model, using these benchmarks as a guide. 
 275  Bankruptcy cases involving multiple related debtors are often administratively 
consolidated in order to save money and avoid duplicative effort.   
 276  As Professor LoPucki has pointed out to Author in private correspondence, in 
some instances, the cost of the same motion does and should vary with the size of the 
case and other variables.  As a result, a regression analysis will be necessary to make 
the data comparable.  There seems to be no reason why members of the crowd could 
not also do this work. 
 277  11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3)(E) (2011) requires bankruptcy courts to determine, “with 
respect to a professional person, whether the person is board certified or otherwise 
has demonstrated skill and experience in the bankruptcy field.” 
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rough proxy of general experience and provides no insight into an 
associate’s bankruptcy experience.278  If a bankruptcy experience 
database were created, Fee Controllers could more easily determine 
the appropriateness of the rates being charged by bankruptcy 
professionals. 
Some commentators have argued that bankruptcy is not the place 
for innovation to occur.279  There seems, however, to be no reason why 
innovative ideas could not spread from bankruptcy to other areas of 
the law instead of the other way around.  And again, crowdsourcing 
may merely compliment existing forms of information-gathering and 
information-processing already available to and employed by Fee 
Controllers.  By enhancing chapter 11’s top-down system with 
crowdsourced features, chapter 11 could be improved in some of the 
ways described in this Article. 
B. What Might Crowdsourcing Look Like in Chapter 11? 
Designing an optimal crowdsourcing solution for chapter 11’s 
problems is likely to be complicated and may require an iterative 
process.  A well-designed system will need to determine, among other 
things: (i) who belongs in the crowd;280 (ii) how to notify the crowd that 
a potential problem is available to be solved; (iii) how to incentivize 
the crowd to participate;281 (iv) who owns the solutions offered by the 
 
 278  See Lubben, The Microeconomics of Chapter 11, supra note 3, at 88. 
 279  Id. at 91 (arguing that if “the direct costs of chapter 11 are in line with other 
large corporate transactions . . . general improvements in the market for professional 
services, rather than any bankruptcy-specific innovation” is the appropriate way to 
reduce chapter 11 costs). 
 280  The appropriate crowd is likely to vary with the type of problem being solved.  
Although some tasks may benefit from being offered to the largest possible crowd of 
potential problem-solvers, other tasks might be more effectively solved by limiting the 
size of the crowd.  On the one hand, even when a problem is opened to everyone in 
the world, the crowd of solvers may be “surprisingly small” at times.  Franklin et al., 
supra note 242.  On the other hand, it is important to try to prevent over-participation 
by self-interested parties.  Fennell, supra note 11, at 404.  In addition, too many 
potential solutions can be worse than too few when all of the solutions need to be 
filtered through a limited group of people before they can be implemented.  See 
Vermeule, supra note 180, at 2 (expressing concern about creating a potential choke-
point).   
  Appropriately defining who should be in the crowd may require some 
experimentation.  While a larger crowd ought to produce better results, it will only do 
so if Fee Controllers can effectively sort through the unhelpful “assistance” to find the 
new, useful information provided by the crowd.  Different crowdsourcing systems have 
employed different methods, and it remains to be seen what will be most effective in 
chapter 11 cases. 
 281  Cf. Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Noise Reduction: The Screen Value of Qui 
Tam, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1169 (2014) (discussing how to construct appropriate 
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crowd;282 (v) whether larger tasks must be divisible into smaller 
pieces;283 (vi) whether members of the crowd must be able to build on 
each other’s work;284 and (vii) whether crowdsourcing must be an 
online process.285  Another critical inquiry relates to quality control: 
how to sort high-quality information from low-quality information.286  
The next three sections of this Article offer some preliminary thoughts 
on three of the most challenging of these questions, but the precise 
parameters of a crowdsourced fee control system’s design is beyond 
the Article’s scope.  These issues will be explored in a planned follow-
up. 
i. Who Is in the Crowd? 
As originally conceived by Jeff Howe, crowdsourcing involved 
inviting a crowd to solve a particular problem by issuing an open 
invitation on the Internet and allowing respondents to self-select 
 
incentives to encourage parties to disclose high-quality information of potential 
overcharging but not low-quality information). 
 282  Some scholarship has distinguished open-source and crowdsourced solutions 
based on who retains ownership of the work product.  In the former case, the 
information is typically owned by no one or remains in the public domain.  In the 
latter case, information typically becomes the property of the requesting party.  See, 
e.g., Brabham, Crowdsourcing as a Model, supra note 178; Orozco, supra note 163 
(suggesting that, in a crowdsourcing model, the “lion’s share of value” is captured by 
the crowdsourcing company). 
 283  Ichatha, supra note 242, at 1112 (divisible projects allow people to work in 
parallel with each other and also allows those with only a few spare hours to devote to 
contribute meaningfully to a project where everyone else is similarly a part-time 
contributor); Stephenson, supra note 12, at 1468 (discussing divisibility in the context 
of information substitutes and compliments).  See also Fennell, supra note 11, at 405 
n.82 (noting that, for some projects, the “modularity” of tasks—the ability to break 
down the project into chunks—is the greatest challenge for the requesting party) 
(citations omitted); Franklin et al., supra note 242 (dividing a project into microtasks—
those taking not more than one minute in the usual cases—allows the participation of 
people who have no special training and does not require a lot of their time); Wolfson 
& Lease, supra note 241. 
 284  See, e.g., Ichatha, supra note 242, at 12 (Crowdsourcing’s power comes from the 
ability to engage in a “collaborative community initiative.”).  
 285  See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 11, at 390 (claiming that new technologies, such as 
the Internet, can lower the cost of acquiring information, which would shift the 
efficient level of information obtained upward); Mergel et al., supra note 10, at 2074 
(noting that the Internet has “further enhanced” crowdsourcing). 
 286  A lot of the crowdsourcing literature has also addressed this question.  See, e.g., 
Howe, supra note 177 (The larger and more diverse the group, the larger number of 
solutions you may receive that are almost all “complete crap.”); see also Fennell, supra 
note 11, at 394; Franklin et al., supra note 242 (looking at mTurk’s reputation scores); 
Schmitt-Sands & Smith, supra note 228 (suggesting reputation scores, but also 
adequate cash incentives, screening for intrinsically motivated people, building the 
Requestor’s reputation with the work force, and verifying the crowd’s findings directly 
as a quality-control mechanism); Vermeule, supra note 180. 
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whether they would like to help determine a solution.287  Subsequently, 
however, crowdsourcing experimenters have concluded that 
unconstrained crowds are not universally good.  For one, without 
constraints, it is difficult to prevent self-interested parties from over-
participating.288  Instead, Professor Lee Anne Fennell has argued that 
the goal should be to “engage participation that is appropriately scaled 
and representative,” which will typically not mean maximizing 
participation.289   In addition to concerns about self-interested behavior, 
more information tends to be received with larger crowds, resulting in 
information of a lower average quality.290 
Some experimentation is likely warranted.  Even with an open 
call, in some cases few people are interested in participating in 
crowdsourcing exercises.  Perhaps fee control issues will prove to be a 
set of problems that few people are interested in helping to solve.291  In 
that case, it may be that inviting anyone who is interested would be the 
appropriate solution.292  Alternatively, it may suggest the importance of 
targeting potential problem solvers and then working to incentivize 
their participation.293  In addition, some crowdsourcing scholars, such 
as Professor Daren Brabham, have suggested that limiting 
participation is often more useful than realized.294 
Whether a crowdsourced fee control system should use an open 
call or not will depend heavily on how many people are interested in 
participating, whether interested parties engage in self-interested 
behavior that distorts the process, and how effectively the system can 
process all of the information that is received.  It does seem, however, 
that if these problems can be adequately addressed, an open call would 
be appropriate.  As discussed above, Fee Controllers would benefit 
from the information provided by bankruptcy experts and non-experts 
alike, whether or not those people are involved in a particular 
bankruptcy case. 
 
 287  Howe, supra note 177. 
 288  Fennell, supra note 11, at 404. 
 289  Id. at 408.  
 290  Stephenson, supra note 12. 
 291  See Franklin et al., supra note 242. 
 292  Ichatha, supra note 242, at 14 (arguing that “at least one potential problem-
solver in the group needs to be good enough to solve the problem or one of its 
modules”). 
 293  Schmitt-Sands & Smith, supra note 228 (discussing the ability to screen workers 
based on their reputation). 
 294  Brabham, Crowdsourcing the Public Participation Process, supra note 12 (noting that 
many articles caution against the optimistic view of public participation). 
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ii. Incentivizing the Crowd 
A crowdsourced fee control system will need to develop 
appropriate incentives for encouraging the crowd’s participation.  The 
current system does not provide appropriate incentives, which is why 
many parties-in-interest to bankruptcy cases do not already participate 
in fee control.  If a crowdsourced fee control system is to encourage 
better participation, it is important to consider how to limit the costs 
of participating and/or how to increase the available rewards (for 
those who can currently participate) or create appropriate rewards 
(for those who cannot). 
The existing crowdsourcing literature has identified an array of 
possible incentives for encouraging participation that may be relevant 
to a crowdsourced fee control system, including: (i) money;295 (ii) 
altruism;296 (iii) reputation;297 (iv) demonstrating competence, 
particularly in a new field;298 (v) creating a sense of belonging or group 
membership;299 (vi) entertainment;300 and (vii) intellectual 
fulfillment.301  Importantly, the appropriate incentive for different 
members of the crowd will likely differ.  For some, no incentive—
certainly no monetary incentive—is required.  Instead, providing the 
answer is its own reward.302  This type of incentive is evident in many 
areas of the Internet, where users volunteer enormous amounts of 
sometimes very personal information about their lives and 
experiences.303  Even where monetary rewards are used to incentivize 
participation in crowdsourcing projects, crowdsourced labor has 
frequently proven to be cheaper than using traditional employees.304  
This seems particularly likely to be true in the legal arena, where the 
hourly rate of some restructuring professionals is substantially higher 
than the rates paid to Turkers. 
In addition, it is not clear that the question of what sort of 
incentive to offer can be disaggregated from the question of who 
 
 295  Ichatha, supra note 242; Orozco, supra note 163, at 6. 
 296  Ichatha, supra note 242; see also Fennell, supra note 11, at 405; Orozco, supra note 
163, at 7. 
 297  Ichatha, supra note 242. 
 298  Id. 
 299  Id.; see also Brabham, Crowdsourcing as a Model, supra note 178, at 82 (social 
capital); Orozco, supra note 163, at 7. 
 300  Orozco, supra note 163, at 7 (Crowdworkers often describe contributions as “a 
fruitful way to spend extra time.”). 
 301  Brabham, Crowdsourcing as a Model, supra note 178, at 82. 
 302  Fennell, supra note 11, at 405. 
 303  Id. at 392–93. 
 304  Howe, supra note 177. 
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should be in the crowd.  If people are generally disinterested in 
participating, larger incentives will probably be required.  But if 
interest is robust, smaller incentives ought to be sufficient.  In addition, 
if fee control activities are competing for the attention of Turkers, the 
incentives can likely be small since HITs tend to pay poorly.  By 
contrast, if fee control activities are competing for the attention of busy 
lawyers, accountants, and investment bankers, the incentives will likely 
need to be larger because these professions tend to pay fairly well.305  
Finally, it may also be that a larger incentive is needed at first to 
overcome initial inertia, but once people get used to participating in 
fee control activities, the incentives can be altered.306 
iii. Quality Control Issues 
Quality control has been an issue with crowdsourcing 
experiments.  One television executive who successfully crowdsourced 
a new program, described most of the non-winning responses as 
“complete crap.”307  But even this executive found gold among the 
dreck.  Others too have found that quality control is a surmountable 
challenge.308  One possible solution is to limit who may participate in a 
crowdsourced fee control system in an attempt to generate higher-
quality information, at least for certain tasks.309  Other successfully 
employed solutions involved creating a reputation score for members 
of the crowd,310 spot-checking the results of the crowd,311 and 
empowering a small group of decision-makers to judge the suggestions 
 
 305  It may also be the case, however, that anonymity would be sufficient.  It may be 
that the reason why professionals who are troubled by excessive or inappropriate 
requests for compensation do not speak up is because they fear retribution.  
Alternatively, certain lawyers or law firms might attempt to make their reputation as 
the “honest” lawyers and could bolster that reputation by publicly attacking the 
unreasonable fee and expense requests of other professionals. 
 306  Fennell, supra note 11, at 405. 
 307  Howe, supra note 177 (describing the response of “Michael Hirschorn, 
executive vice president of original programming and production at VH1 and a 
creator of the cable channel’s hit show Web Junk 20”).  
 308  See Schmitt-Sands & Smith, supra note 228; see also Julie S. Downs et al., supra 
note 228. 
 309  Schmitt-Sands & Smith, supra note 228 (noting the benefits of identifying 
intrinsically motivated participants). 
 310  See id. (discussing the ability to screen workers based on their reputation); see 
also Fennell, supra note 11, at 394; Michael J. Franklin et al., supra note 242 (looking 
at reputation scores in mTurk).  
 311  Schmitt-Sands & Smith, supra note 228; see also Krmpot Vera, The Fight Against 
Corruption-Crowdsourcing, 3 INT’L J. ECON. & L. 61, 61 (2013) (suggesting that a 
“relatively small number of people can be [sic] coordinate the activities of a large 
number of those who contribute”).  
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offered by the crowd.312 
Once again, time will tell what works best for a crowdsourced fee 
control system, including issues pertaining to quality control.  If the 
volume of information received is minimal, perhaps the United States 
Trustee will be best situated to vet the information received and to 
object where the United State Trustees’ office deems appropriate.  
Alternatively, the crowd—through employing a multi-step process of 
generating ideas, refining the original suggestions, and verifying the 
data’s accuracy—may be able to ensure the information passed along 
to judges is of high quality.313 
CONCLUSION 
As this Article defines crowdsourcing, the process of solving 
problems by drawing on the contributions of many people, it has been 
around for as long as humans have worked together to solve 
problems.314  The concept has been employed by both non-profit 
organizations and commercial enterprises for decades, and with great 
success.315  This Article offers some preliminary thoughts on how 
crowdsourcing can be usefully employed in the commercial 
bankruptcy system. 
Crowdsourcing is useful for performing the sort of tasks that 
plague chapter 11’s current fee control system.  As described above, 
crowdsourcing is a process of obtaining needed services, information, 
ideas, or content by soliciting contributions from a large group of 
people.  It is also a particularly useful strategy for subdividing tedious 
work, and it is most effective when each participant can perform a 
discrete portion of the work that must be done.  These are exactly the 
problems chapter 11’s fee control system needs to solve.  Chapter 11 
would benefit if Fee Controllers had additional information about 
potential overcharging in fee applications, and if they could outsource 
some of the tedious, detail-oriented work required by a typical fee 
review.  Individually, each member of the crowd could make small but 
significant contributions to chapter 11’s fee control process.  
Collectively, the crowd can make important and potentially game-
changing contributions.  Chapter 11’s fee control system should be re-
examined to determine where crowdsourcing can make the most 
 
 312  See Vermeule, supra note 180, at 1.  
 313  See supra note 268. 
 314  See, e.g., supra note 10. 
 315  The Audobon Society crowdsources its yearly North American bird count. See 
AUDOBON.ORG, supra note 10; cf. Ichatha, supra note 242, at 1011 (discussing how the 
British Government crowdsourced a solution to the “Longitude Problem”). 
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significant impact. 
Crowdsourcing holds great promise for fixing chapter 11’s flawed 
fee control system.  In other contexts, crowdsourcing has resulted in 
creative solutions to problems that previously stumped experts in those 
fields.  Crowdsourcing has allowed the National Audubon Society to 
attempt to count every bird in the Western Hemisphere every year 
since at least 1900.316  Pillsbury, considered one of the earliest 
progenitors of crowdsourcing, has been relying on the wisdom of 
crowds to produce better baked goods via its “Pillsbury Bake-off” mail-
in cooking competition since 1949.317  Based on these examples and 
the other examples offered throughout this Article, there is reason to 
believe that crowdsourcing would result in creative solutions being 
developed to fix flaws in chapter 11’s fee control system. 
This Article has sought explain why crowdsourcing might be 
useful in the fee control context; however, all of the particulars have 
not been worked out yet and much work remains to be done.  Yet this 
is hopefully the first step in building a better bankruptcy system for the 
years to come. 
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